

Gender, Migration and intercultural Interaction
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Policy Analysis Report (WP3)

Cyprus

Ge.M.I.C.

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Introduction: The Policy Context in Cyprus

Indicators such as “indicators of net migration”, terms such as “migration control” and “border patrol” and taxonomies of migrants are neither ‘net’ nor purely technical. According to a 2003 Eurostat survey Cyprus has the highest net migration rate in EU. The dramatization of in-coming migratory flows, combined with statements on the “small size” of Cyprus and its vulnerable position as a “border” state member, is often used to support the argument that border control policies must be implemented more adequately, more effectively, more decisively. Paradoxically, underneath the decisiveness of this urge lies the indecisiveness of borders: where exactly does this dismembered member state—a full EU member state without full application of the Acquis since the Acquis is not implemented in the North—draw the borders which it patrols? Such statements on the “dramatic increase” of migrant workers and malignant others have intensified since Cyprus’s EU accession (May 1st 2004), an event which has intersected with the opening of the checkpoints on the Green Line (April 23, 2004), also known as the “Buffer Zone”, which divides Cyprus between Turkish occupied north and Greek Cypriot south. Though such statements give the impression that migration in-flows have intensified over the last few years, net migration had already started to increase in the late 80s, reaching its first pick in 1991/1992 with the in-flow of a great number of Greek Pontians (9,6 in 1992, see Annex, Tables 1 and 2). Whether it is the actual increase of net migration or the increase of pressure on the Republic of Cyprus from international bodies to introduce refugee reception policies and to combine migration policies with integration policies is something to be investigated in the context of this project. An apparent contradiction to be noted early on, however, is that social panic on the increase of migrants and illegal migrants (the two are often conflated even in official state discourse) rises at a time when state policy actors are beginning to appeal to multiculturalism and respect for others as regulatory principles.

Net Migration, as we have already suggested, is not such a “clear” representation of migration flows as the term “net” implies. There are kinds of migration flows taking place behind and beyond the figures presented in the Demographic Reports of the Republic of Cyprus. These flows remain invisible in the official discourse on migration, and there are kinds of intercultural encounters which are accentuated, facilitated or even prohibited by the way the state regulates migration flows. There are also kinds of intercultural interactions—transculturations, to use a term by anthropologist Mary Louise Pratt (1992)—which are rendered inconsequential by the securitization of migration “flows” as well as by the nationalization of migration policy.¹

¹ Many reports relevant to migration commissioned by EU adopt a formalistic approach to this problem. Usually they state in an introductory note that coverage is limited to areas controlled by the Government. See for example the Introductory Note to Cyprus Country Report on Migration and Asylum 2003 on the Commission’s official website on Justice and Home Affairs:

“This report is concerned with the trends and policies in the fields of migration, asylum and illegal stay in the Republic of Cyprus. All provided and interpreted data refers only to the part of the island controlled by the government.”

(available online at:

http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/asylum/statistics/docs/2003/country_reports/cyprus.pdf)

A similar approach is adopted in Reports on Anti-discrimination. In a section entitled “Introductory Remarks”, this Report only covers the territory controlled by the Cyprus Republic and does not extend to the 35% of Cyprus

1. Reckoning with the ethno-national limits of migration discourse

The continuing occupation of the north part of Cyprus by Turkey since the Turkish invasion of 1974 and the territorialisation of ethnic division along the two sides of the Green Line (the Green Line being both a military buffer zone and an ethnic divide) have implications for the ways in which the Republic frames the discourse of migration, institutes and regulates categories of migrants. The Cyprus problem, as will be explained here, constitutes one of those barriers that render some kinds of migration flows invisible in and by official state migration discourse. So far, none of the official reports of the Republic of Cyprus on migration, ethnic minorities, gender equality, trafficking, asylum seekers, refugees and trafficking in Cyprus have addressed migration flows in the north part, or between north and south. From the perspective of the Republic of Cyprus (with a government that is *de jure* and *de facto* a Greek Cypriot Government), to speak of migration flows to the north would implicate the recognition of the TRNC as a legal state, whereas to speak of migration across the Green Line would implicate the recognition of the Line as a state border. Reports speak only of "settlers" in the north and "illegal migrants" who enter the Republic from illegal entry points on the Green Line, from the "occupied" to the "free areas". Though the incompleteness of the coverage is acknowledged, it is attributed to the exception of the north from the effective control of the Republic, to the lack of reliable sources and to the inaccessibility to data.

In this report we will deal with this problem in a different way. Instead of dealing with the problem as a given situation, an irremovable obstacle, a terminus that delineates the range of our discussion, a "cover" that protects the report from reckoning with the political implication of discourse, we will deal with the problem as an "aporia" (Derrida 1993): an experience of undecidability that, on the one hand, blocks premeditated, algorithmic approach to legal categories of migration and, on the other hand, obliges us to question the discursive regime of migration and obliges us to come up with other ways to speak of migration.

Reckoning with this aporetic situation, we have before us three possible ways of action. First, to rely only on sources of information which comply with the official rhetoric of the Republic of Cyprus (thus to talk of migration as if migration took place only in the Greek Cypriot south and as if the north did not exist). Second, to defy the discursive regime of the Republic, to adopt a "neutral" perspective and to extend the coverage of the report on both "sides" as if the kinds of force and violence that established and continue to maintain the "two sides" did not matter. In other words, to review what happens in the south and, relying on academic sources by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot scholars, to review and "speak of" migration flows and migrants in "Northern Cyprus" (as if the TRNC was not an illegal state, as if the invasion and the ongoing occupation of northern Cyprus is not a problem). The third, approach, the

territory that has been under Turkish occupation since 1974. With the settlement of the Cyprus problem an additional section will be required so that the northern part of the island and the specific issues of discrimination related to the Turkish-Cypriot community are addressed (Report on Measures to Combat Discrimination in the 13 Candidate Countries (VT/2002/47) Country Report Cyprus, May 2003). In journal articles by Greek Cypriot authors this problem is also dealt with as a problem of inaccessibility to data. For example, Trimikiniotis and Pantelides (2003), state in their abstract: "*For the purposes of this study, we will concentrate on the territory controlled by the Republic of Cyprus, as there is little access to the north and hence difficulty in collecting the relevant data.*"

one that we will adopt, is a more complicated. We will strategically and tentatively abide with the official Greek Cypriot discourse while, at the same time, expose and problematize its silences on migration in the north. In doing so, we will include in this Report information on migration in the north which is provided by Turkish and Turkish Cypriot scholars in academic articles and public media, while also problematizing the deliberate blindness in some of these sources to force and violence.

1.1. The migration flows: Who are the Migrants? (Or, Why indicators of net migration are not that clear)

Although studies on transnationalism have pointed out that migration experience is overdetermined by state politics and that new forms of agency, solidarity, cultural experience and cultural production take place within "migration scapes" (Appadurai, 1996), migration policies are regulated to a great extent by states and legitimized by ideologies of the nation-state. In the case of Cyprus, the regulation of migration flows and the legal definition of categories of migrants are deployed in accordance to ethno-national politics and the economy's needs for low skill cheap labour. The framing of Pontian migrants as repatriates is one instance of such a deployment of migration policies. The elimination of certain kinds of migratory flows from both statistics and official migration discourse is another example.

The demographic categories used in the Demographic Statistics Reports of the Republic of Cyprus are based on the following legal definitions:

Emigrants are persons who have left Cyprus with the intention to settle abroad or to stay for one year or more. This category includes persons who depart from Cyprus after staying more than one year in the country on the expiry of their contract of employment or students after completion of their studies.

Short-term immigrants are persons who enter Cyprus with the intention of remaining less than one year for the purpose of working at an occupation remunerated from within the country or studying. This category may include dependents who accompany such persons or come to join them.

Long-term immigrants are persons who enter Cyprus with the intention to settle in Cyprus or to stay for one year or more.

This taxonomy of migrants exempts several kinds of irregular others: crossers of the Green Line (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots), settlers and migrants to North Cyprus and illegal migrants (illegal migrants who enter the Republic from the north by crossing the Green Line or migrants who enter legally the Republic on short term visas, and. The latter, as it will be explained in the next section, constitutes a controversial category since what it at stake is not only the legality of migrants themselves but the legality of the authority who regulates their admission.

1.1.1. Migration Flows regulated by the Republic of Cyprus

Table 1 (Migration flows to and from Cyprus, 1981-2005) shows that net migration followed a steady decrease after 1992 reaching its lowest point in 2000 (3.906) and, since then, has been following again an increasing trend to reach the figure of 15,3 in 2003. Migration flows

to Cyprus during the early 1990s consisted mainly Greek Pontians² who migrated originally to Greece from Russia, Kafkasus and Georgia and, at a later stage, migrated from Greece to Cyprus (because these Pontians were naturalized by the Greek Government and had already Greek passports when they moved to Cyprus, they were framed by the Cypriot Government as "repatriates" rather than migrants. This migratory flow from Greece was not legitimated on the basis of economy's needs for "flexible labour" but on the basis of national ideologies. Greek Pontians filled Cyprus' labour market needs for low-cost labour, particularly in constructions (men) and hotel cleaning services (women).

Pontian migration was followed by two other migratory in-flows in the 90s, Russian migrants, migrants from Easter-European countries and migrants from Asian countries, mostly female migrants from Sri Lanka and the Philippines. Trimiklionitis and Demetriou (2005) attribute the high number of Russian immigrants to the policy of Cyprus, prior to its accession to the EU, to allow Russian nationals to enter the Republic without visas, in an effort to attract businessmen, holiday makers and capital (Table 3 in Annex shows that in 2003 Russians comprised the top inflow of Third Country Nationals to Cyprus). According to Trimiklionitis and Demetriou this policy resulted in several thousands of affluent Russians migrating to Cyprus and establishing offshore businesses, Russian schools and Russian churches" (Migration Report 2003: 3). Table 4 (Annex), based on data from the most available Demographic Report (2005), shows that Russia ranks second among the countries of origin for Third Country National migrants, with Sri Lanka and Philippines ranking first and third correspondingly. These gender disaggregated figures, however, show a significant shift in Russian migration. Whereas in 2001 the figures of male and female Russian migrants were about the same (953 men and 904 women), by 2005 there has been a significant shift in gender distribution (355 men and 902 women). These figures show that the hypothesis of affluent Russian and Russian businessmen does not apply to the recent migration flows from Russia. They also show that all migration flows from non EU Easter-European countries and Asian countries are becoming feminized.

Table 5 (Annex) shows emigrants by citizenship and sex. What this table suggests is that those who emigrate from Cyprus are EU nationals and Third Country Nationals who had earlier immigrated to Cyprus. If we compare emigration numbers for Cypriot men and Cypriot women, we will notice that emigration from Cyprus used to be mostly male migration (in 2002, 1288 men and 353 women). If we break down the emigration reduction rates by gender, however, we will notice that between 2002 and 2005 male emigration reduced to 11% for men and 46% for women. If we look at emigration of Cypriots by age we will see that the majority of emigrating Cypriot women are in the age group of 25-29 whereas men spread across a longer age range (20-34). Though the major flows of out-going migrations take place in earlier periods, outside the time scope of this report, it is important to comment on some of these flows since 1974 since statements on the reduction of "native Cypriots" are

² The original ethnic term used for this category of migrants in the late '80s and early '90s was "Rossopontioi". This term, however, was deemed derogatory by the migrants themselves because, as they argued, it denied their "Greekness". Two terms which have been used interchangeably since are "Greek Pontians" ("Ελληνοπόντιοι") and "Greeks of Pontos" ("Έλληνες του Πόντου"). The term "Rossopontioi" would be the most accurate perhaps as it codifies the language difference and migratory itinerary of the group. The use of this term, however, would replicate the ideology of cultural deficit implied by the derogatory meaning of "Rossopontioi". The term "Pontioi", on the other hand, is also a term with derogatory meaning, used particularly by students when they are engaged in name calling and other forms of bullying. For this reason, we will be using the term Greek Pontians ("Ellinopontioi"), a term which has been established in the Cypriot context as a politically correct term.

related to the general discourse on migration and demographic change. According to Gilles Bertrand (2004), beginning in 1954 with the first events of ethnic conflict, migration increased to an average of about 3,800 a year. The peak periods were between 1964 and 1974, when the majority of the Turkish Cypriots lived in Enclaves, and the period following the Turkish invasion and the violent partitioning of the island. Between 1974 and 1976, about 12,000 Greek Cypriots, 2,000 members of the minority religious communities and about 15,000 Turkish Cypriots left the island, whereas a much larger number of Turkish Cypriots emigrated, mainly to the UK, over the following years. According to sources cited by Bertrand—the RoC [Republic of Cyprus; author's comment], the Council of Europe, opponents of Rauf Denktaş and sometimes his own advisors—60,000 to 90,000 Turkish Cypriots "have fled the island since 1974". The emigration of Turkish Cypriots is highly politicized both by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, as an event that testifies to the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot community and the need to lift sanction on the TRNC, and by the RoC in order to argue that demographic composition in the north has changed, Turkish nationals outnumber Turkish Cypriots, and turkification of the north is an imminent threat.

1.1.2. The exceptional state of the North: Settlers, Migrants and commuter border-crossers

Turkish Cypriots distinguish between "settlers" (yerleşik) and migrants (göçmen), but hesitate to classify the children of "settlers". The derogatory term "karasakal" (meaning man with black beard), used sometimes by Turkish Cypriots to refer to settlers in private intra-ethnic conversations), is indicative of the intersectionality between male gendering and racialization of settlers. Though they would definitely not consider them "settlers" (outsiders) they would not consider them Turkish Cypriot either (just children of settlers who "have a right to stay here"). The delineation between illegal settlers and legal migrants is further troubled by the presence of other others, "stowaway Syrians, ex-student Pakistanis and Bulgarians Turks" (Çağlar 2007).

From a Turkish Cypriot perspective, the distinction between migrants and settlers remains a crucial one. The talk on migrants (most of them from Turkey) and migrant rights, on the one hand, inaugurates within the Turkish Cypriot public sphere a discursive field on human rights. Within this discursive field new governmental and non-governmental human rights organizations develop and human rights advocates call for legal reforms, often grounding this call on EU harmonization (whether reforms introduced in order to promote harmonization with EU law can be effective without TRNC state recognition and whether NGOs-without-state can have political agency are some of the critical questions that need to be asked in regards to the exceptional 'state' of North Cyprus). Turkish settlers, on the other hand, constitute a category of malignant others (illegal, unwanted, ethnically different, culturally inferior) against which Turkish Cypriots reclaim their Cypriotness as a marker of ethnic identity and social status. Çağlar, however, argues that the othering of "settlers" is not just a process of othering but an act of social outcasting and racist hatred. Settlers, he argues, constitute a legitimate target of Turkophobia, that is, racist hatred against the Turks (ibid.). In the political imaginary (probably Çağlar refers the Turkish Cypriot political imaginary) the settlers embody Turkish barbarism, Turkish backwardness, Turkish imperialism, Turkish Islam. Çağlar's hypothesis can also be applied to the Greek Cypriot political imaginary, particularly the recent framing of the desirable solution by President Christofias as "a solution by the Cypriots for the Cypriots". By reclaiming the historical, cultural and political links between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots under the banner of "one people", the initiative of the

Greek Cypriot Leftist government for rapprochement and ethnic reconciliation delegitimizes Turkophobic sentiments against Turkish Cypriots. By the same logic, however, Turkophobia can be channelled to settlers because those are Turks. What makes settlers such an ideal receptacle for Turkophobia is that they cannot talk back.

From the perspective of the Republic of Cyprus, the typology settlers and migrants is a meaningless one. To adopt such a typology would mean that the official government of the Republic of Cyprus recognizes TRNC's authority to regulate migration and to exercise border control and this would implicate the recognition of TRNC itself as a state. What is at stake here is not the illegality of settlers and the legality of migrants but the authority of TRNC as an illegal entity to pass and to implement migration laws (a kind of authority that bestows to its carrier the sovereignty of a state). Migration policies in the North have also been problematized by Turkish Cypriot scholars and human rights activists. Without state recognition, without harmonization with the Acquis and without having ratified any international conventions on Human Rights, the North itself constitutes a "state of exception", with foreign workers' rights being violated, entry visas and deportation orders issued arbitrarily, often under the pressure of big construction companies (Hatay 2008).

Reckoning with such unspeakable migrations constitutes a challenge for this project. Aligning with the state politics of non-recognition (i.e., not recognizing the illegal state of TRNC and not compromising the UN Security Council's framing of the Cyprus Problem as a problem of invasion and occupation) and normalizing the silence on migrations in north Cyprus would compromise the quality and justice of this project. But to equate all movements of peoples, all relocations, all mobilities to "migrations" erases the political context and the distinctiveness and complexity of each case. Even more dangerously, to assign migration or mobility a normative meaning is to participate in injustice as multiple kinds of violence become silenced. This project would have to explore the possibility of going beyond this algorithmic solution.

1.1.3. Settlers

The policy of settlement and naturalization of Turk Nationals to north Cyprus after 1974 has been 'legally' framed by the Turkish Cypriot Administration though the use of two instruments, the 1975 Act on Naturalisation (policy to give Turkish nationals Cypriot nationality) and the 1981 regulation supplementing the 1975 Act (a decision by the authorities is all that is needed for a person to acquire Cypriot nationality).

The official Demographic Statistics of the Republic of Cyprus do not include data on migration flows to the north, not only because the government of the Republic "does not exercise effective control" over the north but also because from the perspective of the Republic persons who entered Cyprus after 1974 are settlers and not migrants ("settlers"= persons who were re-settled from Turkey to Cyprus in an effort to change the demographic character of north Cyprus). From the perspective of the Republic, there is no distinction between settlers ("mainland Turks", "mainland Turkish colonists" transferred to Cyprus for permanent settlement and naturalized in order to change the demographic profile of Cyprus)³ and

³ The Republic argues that Turkish settlement in the occupied part of Cyprus serves the following policy aims: (1) to change the demographic character and to distort the population balance on the island between Turks and Greeks of the island, in order to justify the claims of the Turkish side regarding the territorial and constitutional aspects of the Cyprus Problem, to ethnically cleanse the occupied area ("aimed at erasing all that was Greek and Christian for centuries and "turkifying" the area") (3) to shift the balance of political power in the occupied part of Cyprus and to

migrants (illegal or legal migrants who come to the north in search of employment). The only official information issued by the Republic of Cyprus on demographic changes in the North is data that demonstrates "illegal demographic changes".⁴ The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, estimates the number of settlers "upwards of 160,000" (the figure includes 2004 arrivals.) a number which outnumbers Turkish Cypriots (estimated at 88,100 in 2004)). The Ministry cites figures from Turkish Cypriot daily *Halkın Sesi* (30/12/05) on new arrivals but rejects the framing of these newcomers as migrants: "44,267 persons were given "work permits" in the period between December 2004 and November 2005, 37,241 grants were given to "first time applicants" (the table from *Halkın Sesi*, as cited by the Ministry, is included in the Annex, Table 6).

Another source of official information on demographic changes in the North is the Report on the Demographic Structure of the Cypriot Communities by Rapporteur Cuco, Spain, Socialist, 27 April 1992, ADOC 6589, 1403 - 23/4/92-4-E), RECOMMENDATION 1197 (1992) on the demographic structure of the Cypriot Communities.⁵ The Cuco Report does not adopt the term "settlers" in its onset but uses, instead, the terms "migrants" and "Turkish Nationals" interchangeably:

It is an established fact that, from 1975 onwards, Turkish nationals arrived in the northern part of Cyprus, where they settled on a long-term basis. The waves of migrants were particularly large in 1975 and 1977 because, even on the lowest estimates, they represented 10% of the Turkish-Cypriot population at that time. Subsequently, there was a smaller, but steady flow (Cuco 1992: 1).

Though the Report does not employ the Republic's terminology of "colonization" and "turkification", it acknowledges that the permanent "settlement" of "Turkish migrants" (Table 7) changes the demographic profile of the "northern part" of the island ("the area controlled by the Turkish-Cypriot Administration, where almost all of the Turkish-Cypriot community live") and constitutes an additional obstacle to the solution of the Cyprus problem:

The aim of the Turkish-Cypriot Administration's policy regarding the Turkish migrants has been to encourage their permanent settlement in the island. Migrants are granted housing, land or properties on special terms. However, the most important measure has been to allow them to

influence elections in order to ensure that the Turkish Cypriot leadership is kept in line with the policy of the Turkish Government (4) to control and manipulate the political will of the Turkish Cypriots (even in the post-solution era), (5) to buttress Turkey's military presence on the island and (6) to prejudice a just settlement of the Cyprus problem (From the official website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available online: http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/cyprus06_en/cyprus06_en?OpenDocument).

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⁵ Assembly debate on 8 May 1992 (8th sitting). See Doc. 6589, report of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography (Rapporteur: Mr Cuco. Text adopted by the Assembly on 7 October 1992 (20th sitting). The report was written in response to the motion for a resolution on the demographic structure of the Cypriot communities (Doc. 6249), presented in May 1990 by Mr Matsis and other members of the Assembly.

acquire Cypriot nationality and hence political rights. The legal texts give the authorities discretionary power in this matter.

The Greek Cypriots are extremely concerned at the arrival of the Turkish migrants. At first, the Turkish Cypriots regarded this injection of manpower as essential. Today, the growing number of migrants, their naturalisation and the important role that some of them play in political life have given rise to wide divergences within the Turkish-Cypriot community.

The presence and naturalisation of the Turkish migrants, who once established on the island become settlers, constitute an additional obstacle to a peaceful, negotiated solution of the Cypriot conflict (ibid.: 2).

After presenting the opinions of "parties concerned" (officials, community leaders, political party spokespersons and union leaders), the Cuco Report adopts more decisively the term "settlers" and concludes that the "arrival and establishment of the Turkish settlers is the most notable demographic occurrence in Cyprus since 1974":

While these settlers were at first seen by the vast majority of Turkish Cypriots as a vital injection of the additional manpower [ibid.] needed by the country, over the years their growing numbers and the role that some of them play in political life have changed initial perceptions and introduced wide divergences within the Turkish-Cypriot community.

The Cuco Report also concludes that "the other migratory flows" in Cyprus since 1974 have been of "minor importance", as is proved by the fact that the arrival of other foreigners in the north and south of the island was mentioned only occasionally in the Rapporteur's talks with the parties concerned. The downplaying of "the other migratory flows" (particularly flows to the areas under the control of the Republic) can be attributed to two reasons, first, the timing of the Report (it was too early to frame the arrivals of Greek Pontians were not framed as "migratory flow") and, second, the othering of these "other migratory flows" as inconsequential since they were seen as temporary.

1.1.4. Migrant workers in the north

Basim and Jenkins (2006) argue that "migrants from Turkey are now a reality and they are part of the economy in North Cyprus" (p. 1). Their study shows that the majority of these migrants are informal migrants (employed illegally, without work permits). In total they find that 27,096 people are working without meeting the registration regulations (34.9 per cent of the total economically active labour force), with the rate of informal labour to the formal registered other labour force being 0.66. According to the authors, informal migrant labourers from Turkey "tend to have lower supply prices" as compared to the local Turkish-Cypriot workers. This is "demonstrated", they argue, "by the lower wage rates and poorer working conditions that they are willing to accept". Informal migrants are employed in all of the economic sectors in North Cyprus and can be found working for the largest and the most modern of firms. Information which the authors cite from the Employment Office reports that for the year 2000 there were 8,406 working permits given to migrants (5,906 annual permits and 2,500 seasonal permits given for seasonal jobs such as citrus picking and tree planting). Basim and Jenkins' findings also report that from 1996 to 2000 the informal employment (the authors define the informal labour market as the number of migrants who are working in the economy of North Cyprus without a work permit) amounted between 35 to 40 per cent of the total labour force (Table 8 and Table 9).

According to the authors, the big number of illegal/informal migrants must be attributed to the lack of political incentives for regulating informal economy rather than to the absence of "border" controls.⁶ With the absence of political interests opposing the growth of the informal labour force, the market forces become the sole factor determining the working conditions and wage rates for informal migrant labour. Another study contacted by Mehmet and Tahiroglu (2000), cited by Mehmet and Jenkins (2000), reports that most of the informal sector workers are "common labourers, and largely unskilled. They are ready to work for the minimum wage with poor working conditions." Mehmet and Tahiroglu estimate that 55.9 per cent are in the service sector, 16.2 per cent are in the production and transportation, 27.1 per cent are construction labourers and the rest are clerical and sales personnel. The average earnings of these workers is estimated between \$10 and \$15 per day (2000 estimate).

More recent data (Mehmet 2007) show that the economic boom of 2004 (accompanied by a boom in construction industry) has been accompanied by an increased inflow of Turkish Migrants, most of them entering on tourist visas. According to Mehmet, in 2004, the numbers of guest workers increased to 12,429, but the big increase occurred in 2005 when the total number of guest workers jumped to 46,010, of which 38,464 were new registrants and 7,546 were extensions (Table 10; "TRNC Labour and Immigration Offices' records" is cited by Mehmet as the source of information). According to Mehmet, it is this increase that led the government to introduce "a new immigration policy", and as an extension of this a new "guest worker scheme" which required that all migrant workers obtained work permits to become guest workers. This "guest worker scheme" went into force on November 1, 2005, subjecting, from that date on, any unregistered migrant worker to a penalty. Moreover, it is the responsibility of the employer to apply to the "Department of Labour" to get a preliminary work permit before the guest workers may enter the country (Mehmet 2007). Guest workers are temporary non-citizens and are expected to return to Turkey when their work permits expire, "although a good number marry and stay" (p. 55). Gender disaggregated data from the same study are cited in Table 11 (Annex).

Internal Migration: Commuter Turkish Cypriots working in the south

The mobility of goods, labour and people across the Green Line has been regulated by the Council Regulation (EC) 866/2004 of 29 April on a regime under Article 2 of Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession¹ (on the Green Line Regulation, hereafter GLR) which has been in force since 1 May 2004. GLR defines the terms under which the provisions of the EU law apply to the movement of persons, goods and services across the Line between the areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control and the areas in which it does. The Regulation provides for a legal framework for the free movement of Cypriots, other EU citizens and third country nationals who cross the Line at the crossing points. According to the available data, in 2008 (the reporting period covers from January to August), 633,163 (2007: 788,823) Greek Cypriots crossed from the government-controlled areas to the northern part of Cyprus and 1,162,739 (2007: 1,348,215) Turkish Cypriots crossed from the northern part of Cyprus to the

⁶ The "borders" of "Northern Cyprus", according to the authors, are very "effectively controlled": "In particular, its border with South Cyprus is highly controlled. Its two seaports and one airport have a very effective interconnected computerized information system that records the movements of people entering and exiting North Cyprus" (p. 9). While the R o C exempts migratory flows in the north from official migration discourse, reports on migration in the north such as this one by Basim and Jenkins include references to borders and border controls which implicate the state recognition of TRNC.

government controlled areas during the reporting period (COM(2008) 529). Though this report provides detailed coverage on the regulation of crossings (with extensive discussion of illegal migration), the mobility of goods and the measures taken to facilitate trade, it does not report on the internal labour mobility of Turkish Cypriots.

Turkish Cypriot commuter economic migrants constitute a significant internal migratory flow in Cyprus. These workers live in the north and work in the south. Özay Mehmet et al (2007) estimate that there are between 5,000 and 6,000 such workers, working in the fields of construction manufacturing and services. The demographic statistics reported here are derived from a special random survey (N = 301) conducted in November 2005 by the same authors. According to this survey, the average age of these workers is 36 years, with a minimum of 15 and maximum of 64 years and only 8.3 percent are female (the survey findings focus entirely on male workers). According to the same survey, the education level of commuter workers is fairly low, with three out of four having no more than secondary schooling, only 22.3 percent having a high school education, and only 4 percent possessing university-level education. Mehmet et al emphasize this finding because it indicates that "the majority of commuter workers in the South are unskilled rather than highly qualified manpower" which "disproves the fear in some quarters of a large volume of human capital loss to the South" (p. 51). Data about the labour mobility of Turkish Cypriot across the Green line are also provided by the Statistics Section of the Social Insurance Services. According to the Statistical Data Relating to the Schemes Administered by the Social Insurance Services, the number of insured Turkish Cypriots was 3,470 in 2006, 3,772 in 2005, 3,666 in 2004. Table 12 (Annex) shows the number of Turkish Cypriots engaged in employment in the government controlled area and who contributed to the Social Insurance Fund by economic activity and district of employment for April 2008.⁷ The divergence between the figure of Turkish Cypriot commuter workers reported by Mehmet et al and the figures cited by Social Insurance Department can be attributed to fact that almost half of these migrants are not insured. According to Mehmet (2006) 42,9 of Turkish Cypriot commuter workers are not covered by social security protection.

1.1.5. Other mobilities across the Green Line

Mobility across the Green Line becomes unrepresentable in demographic statistics of the R o C (labour statistics, migration statistics of tourism statistics). To recognize these mobilities as migrations would mean to treat north and south Cyprus as two separate border states when actually these mobilities are supposed to undermine the divide, bridge the gap (economic, social and political) between the two communities and promote the reunification of Cyprus. These mobilities include economic workers (already discussed in the previous section), Roma families who either moved to the south and settled permanently or move seasonally back and forth between north and south, the daily back-and-forth mobility of Turkish Cypriot workers and Turkish Cypriot students who attend private schools on the other side, Greek and Turkish Cypriots who cross for pilgrimage, entertainment or shopping (this category also includes several Third country nationals from the Greek Cypriot site), and tourists (besides Turkish Cypriots, only EU national tourists can cross from the north to the south); Kurds, Syrians, Iranians, Iraqis and others who use north Cyprus as a transit zone in order to enter illegally

⁷ No gender disaggregated data are available from the Social Insurance Service on Turkish Cypriot Workers employed in the south. An estimate of 280 women was a figure cited during a telephone inquiry with the Statistics Office (June 2008).

the Republic. Another kind of mobility which historically preceded the opening of the checkpoints was the mobility of Maronites, a religious Greek Cypriot minority, who were granted a special permit to move back and forth between their Maronite villages in the north and the south.⁸

Since the signing of Cyprus accession Treaty, periodic and annual reports by the Commission on the implementation of Council Regulations on the Green Line constitute the major form on the mobility of people across the Green Line. Police Press Reports by the Police Department of the Republic of Cyprus constitute another source of information. The latter, by virtue of its source and the performativity of its tone, frames the information as a matter of national security. Commission Reports on the Green Line Regulation, on the other hand, appear to be politically neutral as they employ a rather technocratic tone. The emphasis of these Reports, however, is on the implementation of the Green Line Regulation whose purpose is not so much the politics of reunification or inter-ethnic intercultural contact but the mobility of Goods and the facilitation of Turkish Cypriot exports to EU by granting preferential tariffs (The exemption of the north from the Customs Union has prompted the Commission to attempt a balancing act, thereby regarding Northern Cyprus "as" a third country, at least in the context of this trade issue, and invoking Article 133 of the EU Treaty, which covers trade relations with non-EU countries.)⁹

The economic/free trade orientation of the Green Line Regulation Reports, on the one hand, and the securitization of the Green Line (and the crossings) by the Greek Cypriot Media and Police Reports, have overshadowed the intercultural significance of these 'other mobilities'. One particular migration/mobility whose transcultural potential has been completely overstepped is mobility of Turkish Cypriot students. Currently, there are about 300 Turkish Cypriot students who commute to the south on a daily basis to attend schools and other educational institutions. Greek Cypriot Daily *Phileleftheros* reports on this issue:

Around 300 Turkish Cypriot students prefer the free areas for their studies according to the so-called minister of education of the occupied territories, Canan Öztoprak. As reported in publication of the TC press, during the discussion on the "budget" of the so called ministry, Ms. Öztoprak stated that 175 TC students attend primary and secondary education institutions of the free areas and 119 attend tertiary education institutions. During the discussion Mustafa Gokmen, of the Freedom and Reform Party, expressed its dissatisfaction with the TC students' preference for education in the free areas and called the so called ministry of education to re-examine the level of schools in the free areas while he argued that this phenomenon must be terminated. Replying to the critique, Ms. Öztoprak made clear that it is not possible to prohibit to TC students to choose

⁸ In several instances the patriotic loyalty of the Maronite community was questioned because of this mobility. Several Maronites have actually suggested that the reason Maronite male youth were exempted from mandatory army conscription in the past was not so much because the right to cultural/religious identity was recognized as incompatible with the Christian Orthodox and Greek National culture of the National Guard but rather because they were suspected of conducting espionage for the Turkish army.

⁹ Apart from the schemes for promoting North-South trade, the Commission proposals that have the highest profile and are regarded as the most symbolic obviously focus on the issue of direct trade between Northern Cyprus and the rest of the EU. The Commission has been extremely careful to avoid giving the impression of recognising the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" in any shape or form. None of the measures it plans to propose involve any "state authority" in Northern Cyprus and the Commission has co-operated only with private bodies, such as the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce. (EU/Northern Cyprus: Commission Moots Plan to end the Region's Economic Isolation, European Report July 7, 2004, p.502).

education in the free areas and added that the "ministry" has no intention to do so (English translation from Greek translation; *Phileleftheros*, 15.12. 2007).¹⁰

On the 'other side', Turkish Cypriot Daily *Kıbrıs* reports, in regards to the same issue, on publications in the Greek Cypriot daily *Simerini*, which writes that, "According to an announcement by the Minister of Greek Cypriot Education, the number of Turkish Cypriot students in state schools in South Cyprus increased to 100" (Cemal 2007). According to the same source, the number of TC students attending state pre-primary and elementary high is 45, the number of students attending high schools is 40 and the number of students attending the University of Cyprus 15. In English School (a communal school where Turkish Cypriots started attending after 2003), the number of TC students increased from 6 in 2003 to 69 today, while the number of students at Intercollege (now upgraded to Private University and renamed University of Nicosia) is around 50. Commenting on the increase of Turkish Cypriot students in Greek Schools, *Kıbrıs* columnists point to the increased bonds which develop between Greek and Turkish Cypriot students but also analyse the increase of attendance to the south as a symptom of the chaos in Turkish Cypriot schools (Cemal 2007, 2008).¹¹

1.2. The securitization of migration flows: Tracing the overlap of ethno-national politics and EU Migration Policies

This section analyzes in more depth the interaction between ethno-national politics, state performativity and the EU approach of securitization to migration. The multiple discourses which underlie official discourse on migration are analyzed with reference to a specific text, a speech given by the Minister of Interior at the opening ceremony for of a public discussion on migration policy:

For Cyprus, of course, the issue [migration policy] is not limited to legal migration but it also includes illegal migration from where major problems faced by the Republic of Cyprus come from. Because of its geographical position, that is, close to Near and Middle East, which constitute a politically unstable area, Cyprus received in disproportionate, in relation to its absorption capacities, numbers of migrants and asylum seekers who enter illegally.

These problems are further magnified by the very serious problem we face with the occupation of a large part of our territory by the Turkish troops. The inability of the Government to control the biggest part of the coast borders in the North part of the island, leads to the continuous and increasing flows of illegal migrants, who are channelled the Republic control areas, through the Occupied Territories and the Seize Fire Line which is 180 km long. These persons, which constitutes 99% of the illegal migrants, arrive at the Occupied Territories mainly from Turkey, while an important number of them comes either directly with small boats from the Syrian coasts, or, until recently, though the illegal coast line Latakia-Ammochostos. The major countries of origin of illegal migrants are Syria, Iran, Bangladesh, Iraq and Pakistan. We must also mention

¹⁰ The *Phileleftheros* article is based on an article by Hasan Sarpten in Turkish Cypriot Daily *Afrika*. We have tried to preserve the wording of the Greek translation in order to give a glimpse of how the politics of representation are implicated in the representation of mobilities.

¹¹ The decrease of level of public Turkish Cypriot schools is often attributed to the high numbers of settlers and migrants attending these schools.

that the flow of illegal migrants to the free territories is mainly contacted through the British Bases of Dekelia.¹²

Peak numbers—"Cyprus is first in EU in net migration", "Cyprus is first in Asylum seekers"—and demographic changes—i.e., Cyprus' change from country of origin to a destination country—are framed in an apocalyptic rhetoric which establishes the urgency to act, to take measures, to defend borders. Illegal migration is figured as a liminal space against which the scope of a "comprehensive migration policy" and the Republic's effective control are delineated. At the same time, there is a shift in the articulation of borders, from national borders (to be defended) to EU borders (to be patrolled against illegal migrants). Whereas national borders are to be defended against the national other (i.e., Turks), EU borders (i.e., the borders of a "common security space") are to be protected against illegal migrants. Thus the new European-Greek Cypriot partnership is to be inaugurated as "shared border control". The intercultural dynamic of migration is further eliminated by treating the "multicultural character" of Cyprus' as a cultural characteristic and a moral prerogative rather than an interactive and transformative process. In other words, multiculturalism is a characteristic that describes the receiving society rather than a process which implicates transformations of multiple, local and migrant, cultures.

With Cyprus' EU accession, Ethno-national discourse on migration came to incorporate new elements, primarily from the discourse on multiculturalism and respect for cultural diversity, on the one hand, and from the discourse on the securitization of migrants, on the other hand. This 'multicultural turn' of migration discourse is characterized by a certain discontinuities and contradictions: the cultural difference of migrants is reified and treated as a positive value whereas migrants themselves are often excluded from the sphere of the juridico-political; contacts with the others in exceptional spaces (i.e., Rainbow Festival¹³) are celebrated as intercultural contacts whereas contacts in the workplace, in the home (which is also the workplace in the case of female domestic workers), in welfare benefits, in residential areas, in buses and streets are diagnosed as intrusions and threats.

Two historical conditions that made possible this delineation between benign and dangerous others in the case of Cyprus were the proliferation (and securitization) of borders with the opening of the Green Line checkpoints and the regulation of migrants and migrations with EU harmonization of migration law and policies. Whereas until 2003 the only borders to be referenced in the GC ethnonational imaginary were the borders of Kerynia (also, reference point for the struggle for return), with the parallel deployment of the opening of the checking points on the Green Line and the harmonization of border control with EU migration control, borders came to mean something else and to play a different role. Paradoxically, the same geopolitical markers which are used to justify migration control and the securitization of dangerous "flows" are also the symbols used to frame Cyprus' intercultural role in EU. Cyprus's locality is an example of this double use. In his Speech at Ceremony of the Signing of the Treaty of Accession, ex-President Tassos Papadopoulos extolled Cyprus' added value as a border EU state. Cyprus' locality was articulated as an "economic, political and cultural bridge linking the two shores of the Mediterranean," as well as "a necessary bridge of mutual understanding and cooperation between the various religions, cultures and ways of life"

¹² Neoklis Silikiotis, Minister of Interior, Opening speech at the public discussion "Migration Policy of EU and Cyprus." The event was organized by the European Council Offices of Cyprus and Greece, June 13 2008.

¹³ Rainbow Festival is organized on a yealy basis by KISA (Anti-Racism Immigrant Support NGO Organization).

(President Papadopoulos, 2003). The same tropisms of "bridges," however, that incorporate the promise of new intercultural relation and project an intercultural front that is not present yet, also project the uneasiness with too-proximate others and the fear of loose borders and passages. As Diez points out, in stressing its locality as a bridge, Cyprus was also stressing that it is "by implication also different from Middle East" (Diez 2004: 328). If Middle East was the cultural other to be bridged via Cyprus's European accession (Accession Ceremony), it is now another dangerous passage to be patrolled, and the control of this passage is a burden that, as the Minister of Interior argues in his Speech, Cyprus cannot lift alone.

Like the figure of "bridges", the Green Line has carried double signification of contact zone to be sustained and a protective border to be guarded. Regulation (EC) No. 293/2005 of February 17, 2005, amending Regulation (EC) No. 866/2004 on a regime under Article 2 of Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession, refers to "the line between the areas in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control and those areas in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus exercises effective control" (Official Journal of the European Union, February 23, 2005, L50/1). The Commission's algorithmic delineation of controls and their limits is replicated by the Republic to delineate between order and disorder, between "those areas in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus exercises effective control" and the other side of the Green Line. Migrants enter the Republic from the legal entry points of the Republic; illegal migrants (or, at least, 99% of them according to the Minister of Interior) enter the Republic from the "other side."

Whereas the Republic frames the problem of illegal migration as a problem ensuing from the ongoing occupation of north Cyprus by Turkey, the EU adopts a rather different approach. According to Cyprus Police (CYPOL), out of the 5844 illegal immigrants, 5710 entered the government controlled areas across the Line, whereas 128 entered via the Sovereign Base Area and only 6 directly into the government-controlled areas. CYPOL also reported that the main countries of origin of illegal immigrants are Syria (37 %), West Bank (16 %) and Iran (9 %).¹⁴ In its latest Report on the implementation of the Green Line Rule, the Commission reports:

In view of the worryingly high numbers of illegal immigrants, the Commission is of the opinion that the surveillance of the Line between the crossing points conducted by the Republic of Cyprus pursuant to Art 3 GLR and by the Sovereign Base Area Administration pursuant to Art 2 (5) GLR needs substantial strengthening. The Commission recommends that in particular the authorities of the Republic of Cyprus take concrete steps without delay in order to comply with their obligation as regards the surveillance of the Line as defined in the Green Line Regulation also in view of the future participation of Cyprus in the Schengen area. While the Green Line does not constitute an external border, the surveillance obligations of the Republic of Cyprus on the government-controlled side of the Line should be met effectively while at the same time minimising any hindrance to contacts between the two Communities (COM (2008) 529: 5).

In its response to the Republic's concern about illegal migration across the Green Line, the Commission's puts the burden for "the surveillance of the Line" on the Republic. Implicitly, this response also puts the burden on the Republic to deal with the problematic of exercising border patrol on a Border that is not an external border.

¹⁴ Data reported by CYPOL to the Commission for the preparation of the Annual Report on the implementation of Council Regulation (EC) 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 (COM (2008) 529, Brussels, 27.8.2008; this report covers the period 1 May 2007 - 30 April 2008).

2. Gender in Migration Policies

2.1. The invisibility of gender in Migration Statistics

Gender becomes an invisible variant in most migration statistics in two ways. First, gender disaggregated data are very scarce and almost non-existent for the years before 2002. Where there are gender disaggregated data, these are not ethnically disaggregated (so, often, gender and ethnicity are constructed as mutually exclusive categories of demographic, sociological and labour analysis). Second, there is no correspondence between the categories of work visas issued for female migrant workers and the sectors of activity listed in Labour statistics. Thus whereas female Third Country Nationals are holders of "domestic worker" work permits they are actually working as cleaners-and-carers, child carers, old people carers, etc. The only sector of economic activity that covers female migrant labour in Labour Statistics is category P ("Private Households"). Data from different sources, however, show a discrepancy between the number of women working in Private Household (LFS, Labour Force Statistics) and the number of alien female workers registered as "domestic workers" (LIS, Labour Insurance Services Statistic). According to the Labour Force Statistics for 2005 (the latest available), the total year average of employees in P was 14, 200 of which 13,783 (year average) were women. According to Statistics provided by the Labour Insurance Services, however, the total number of alien employees in category P for 2005 (year mean) was 16, 221 (35,09 of total number of alien workers). Although Labour Insurance Services Statistics for aliens are not gender disaggregated, we could safely estimate that almost all of these 16, 221 aliens employed in this category were women. How can we explain this divergence? The most plausible explanation is that female Third Country Nationals, holders of "Domestic Worker" work permits (i.e., registered by their employers as "domestic") are actually employed in sectors: caring, informal private businesses, agriculture (Annex, Tables 13-15).

The first conclusion to be drawn from these tables is that migration is increasingly and the second is that migration is becoming increasingly female. While drawing these conclusions, however, we must keep in mind that the absolute numbers of migrants reported on these tables are much lower than the actual numbers of migrants. A third conclusion to be drawn from Table XX (LIS Statistics 2007) is that feminization of migration intersects with the alienization of migration. In other words, the majority of migrants employed in Cyprus are Third Country National women.

Of the total of 81 828 non-nationals employed in Cyprus, 31, 335 were EU-nationals, with major countries of origin Greece (8622), Romania (6286), UK (4595), Bulgaria (4278), and Poland (3117) and 50, 593 (mean numbers for 2007) were Alien (no gender disaggregated data available). If we look at the national distribution of EU nationals across sectors of economic activity, we will see that, with the exception of Greeks and British who are also employed in white collar jobs, most of them are employed in construction, manufacturing, hotel and trade. Gender becomes again invisible unless we assume that women are employed in sectors such as Private Households, nursing etc. That would be a risky hypothesis, though, as we would have to assume that migrants are employed in gender-specific sectors of employment (with the gender norms of the host country defining and regulating the gender distribution of migrants). There are two other possibilities, however. That is, that migrants challenge the gender profiling of certain jobs or that the availability of

migrant labour in certain fields acts as a catalyst for the further expansion and gender polarization of this sector.

In order to check that hypothesis we would have to focus on the only gender disaggregated data we have, that is, Labour Statistics of 2005. These data have another limitation. Though they are disaggregated by gender and by nationality, nationality is grossly classified as Cypriot Nationals, EU Nationals, Other EU countries and the rest as "Others". Such statistics overshadow the fact that labour migration from non-EU countries is highly feminized. Unfortunately, there are no gender disaggregated labour statistics for labour by nationality and sector of economic activity. The only data which might give a better picture about the gender and nationality are the Demographic Statistics for 2005 which do not include data about employment.

As explained in the previous section, the bi-communal structure of ethnic categorizations and the bi-communal framing of political adversaries have contributed to the normalization of migrants and migration policies as politically inconsequential. Also as discussed before, Cyprus became a migrant destination country only very recently and migration flows to Cyprus have been seen from the onset as strategic and tentative and migrants have been perceived as temporary workers. Migration policies have been understood from the perspective of economic growth and national security but not from the perspective of gender equality, social integration and multicultural social policy. Migration was framed as the import of flexible labour and not addressed as a complicated social phenomenon which implicates the formation of new ethnic communities in Cyprus but also adds new dimensions to gender equality policies.

2.2. Groups of Migrant Women experiencing precarious legal status and/or and social marginality

2.2.1. Female Migrant Domestic Workers/Carers

It is hard to estimate the number of female migrant workers in the areas of domestic cleaning and domestic care for two reasons. First, these two sectors of economic activity, cleaning and care, are formally merged under the category "domestic worker" (οικιακή βοηθός) by both the Migration Office and Labour Office (female migrant workers are registered by their employers at the Labour Insurance Office as "Domestic workers" regardless of the nature of their job; sometimes, they are registered as Domestic assistants even if in reality they are employed as cooks, salespersons or agricultural workers because the minimum salary for Domestic is lower and so mandatory employer contributions to the Social Insurance Fund is also lower). The second reason is that Labour Statistics do not include analysis of Employment by nationality, economic activity and sex. The number of migrant employer as domestic can be deduced from employment under the economic activity "private households" (14, 803 total in 2006, 380 men and 14 423 women). A much higher number has been reported by the Director of the Civil Registry and Migration Department (Ministry of Interior), who estimates the number of female migrant domestic workers in 2007 close to 22,500, signifying a 36% increase from the 2006 figure.¹⁵

¹⁵ Statement made on the National TV Channel (CyBC) show "To syzitame" on 15 March 2007; reference cited by Margarita Zervidou in MIGS Report on Migrant Domestic Workers (MIGS 2008, p. 36).

The number of migrant women employed as artists is also impossible to estimate based on Labour Statistics because the particular area of economic activity (entertainment, artists) is classified by the state as "high risk" and persons employed in this area are exempted from the category Labour Force. Information presented in this report about this group of women is cited mainly from three sources. Parliamentary Proceedings and Parliamentary Committee Reports, the Ombudswoman's 2003 Inquiry on the Status of "Artists",¹⁶ and a recent report by the Mediterranean Institute of Gender studies entitled Mapping the Realities of Trafficking in Women for the purpose of sexual exploitation in Cyprus, October 2007 (MIGS 2007). According to the Commissioner's Report, every semester about 1,000 foreign women come to Cyprus as "artists" and they are disseminated in various cabarets across the island (p. 14). The MIGS Report cites the same number, about 2,000 foreign women, who enter the island every year as 'artistes'. According to statistical data by the Aliens and Migration, presented in a report prepared by the Parliamentary Committee on Crime entitled "Prostitution-trafficking" (October 6 2005), in Cyprus there are 1 014 artists, 80 cabarets and 35 entertainment establishments (μουσικοχορευτικά κέντρα). According to the same report, foreign women are also employed in pubs to work as bar-maids. At the time this Report was compiled, 801 pubs were operating in Cyprus where 1602 foreign women were employed.¹⁷

Until the early '80s, more than 60% of migrant women employed in cabarets were Filipino and Thai (Commissioner's Report, 2003, p. 6). According to the same report, the pay of Asians was almost half of those of foreign women from other countries, thus employment of Asian women was much more profitable. By the 90's, the Cypriot market of prostitution was supplied mostly by women from countries of the ex-soviet block (Commissioner, 2003, p. 13). The Commissioner's inquiry attributes this change in the ethnic distribution of "artists" to two reasons. In 1990 the Government of Philippines issued a prohibition on migration to Cyprus for the purpose of employment in cabarets (this coincided with the opening of new labour market for migrant Filipino women in Cyprus as domestic workers).¹⁸ The fall of the Soviet Union and the eruption of poverty and unemployment in the Soviet Block countries was the second reason, as many women from these countries migrated for employment abroad. The most frequent countries of origin today are Ukraine, Moldavia and Russia. Foreign women admitted to Cyprus under "artist visas" are granted a three month work visa which is renewable for three months. After the lapse of six months from their departure from Cyprus

¹⁶ Commissioner of Administration *Ex Propio Motu* Inquiry on the state of the entrance and occupation of foreign women employed as 'artist' (Αυτεπάγγελτη έρευνα της Επιτροπής Διοικήσεως ως προς το καθεστώς εισόδου και εργασίας αλλοδαπών γυναικών με την ιδιότητα της καλλιτέχνης ΑΥΤ/Ε1/2001). November 24, 2003.

¹⁷ Report prepared by the Parliamentary Committee on Crime entitled "Prostitution-trafficking" (Έκθεση της Κοινοβουλευτικής Επιτροπής για την Εγκληματικότητα για το θέμα που πηλοφορείται «Πορνεία-σωματεμπόριο»), October 6 2005. Minutes of the House of Representatives, October 6 2005.

¹⁸ When the first accusations for sexual exploitation of Filipino women in Cyprus came out, the Government's first response was to introduce quota on the employment of women from Near East (Philippines and Thailand) in cabarets. A' class cabarets (allowed to employ 15-20 artists) were allowed to employ max 12 artists from countries of Near East and supplement the number of their artists from Europe or other countries. B' class cabarets (allowed to employ 10-15 artists where allowed to employ 9 artists from Near East and supplement their number of employees from Europe or other countries (Commissioner 2003: 8-9).

they can be readmitted for another period of six months provided they are employed in the same sector of economic activity (i.e., 'Artists').

The fact that migrant women employed in the "entertainment/prostitution" sector (employed as "artistes/dancers") are from Eastern Europe does not mean that all Eastern European migrants to Cyprus are employed in that field. In fact, a great number of Eastern European women are concentrated in production/industry, services, and farming, jobs which are on the lower end of the market in terms of pay and status. The reason the employment of Eastern European women in the "entertainment/prostitution" sector has attracted more interest is because of the International attention on the combating of trafficking, NGO's research and social activism against trafficking as well as media's frequent publications on this issue. The socioeconomic conditions of Eastern European migrant women in production/industry, services, and farming are yet to be explored. Particularly precarious from the perspective of labour rights seems to be the life of female agricultural workers. Dispersed and often isolated in villages in rural areas of Cyprus, these women are less likely to become visible as ethnic groups.

2.2.2. Greek Pontian Women

The number of Pontian Greeks in Cyprus was estimated in 2004 around 12,000. We could safely say that about half of Greek Pontians are women, since Pontian migration to Cyprus followed a familial mode. Greek Pontian migrant women, however, are hardly visible as an ethnic group as Greek Pontians are almost always gendered as "male". This can be attributed to several reasons: (a) The "talk" about Pontians takes place within discourses which are already gendered as male in terms of their object/theme: police reports, nationality as race, school disobedience, youth violence.¹⁹ (b) It is always Pontian men who express the "voice of the community (elected representatives who often make statements and challenge police reports) or "talk back" (sometimes in socially defiant/deviant manners) it is almost always through the mouth of men. (c) Greek Pontian women are invisible as workers, as mothers, as wives, as civil actors. The stereotypical image for the Greek Pontian women in the early 90s was that of the cleaning woman. By the late '90s new female migrants from Sri Lanka and Philippines took up the sector of domestic cleaning (stay-in migrant women of colour were more precarious more exploitable and more suitable for the domestic workplace of care and cleaning labour) and Pontian woman moved to other low wage jobs (hotel maids and sales persons). In these are kinds of jobs Pontian women become less noticeable as they are literally invisible to the locals (i.e., hotel maids) or mute (saleswomen in big Department stores like Debenhams, clerks in chain shops like McDonalds and Goodies) (d) Finally, another reason for the invisibility of Pontian women (and the male gendering of the Pontian community) is that the Pontian family seems to be patriarchal in a more traditional ways than the Cypriot family (though no empirical research has so far been conducted on this issue). About two thirds of Greek Pontians live in Paphos, in the area of Agapinoros Street, which has been frequently called the "Greek Pontian ghetto". Racial markers of Greek Pontian identity

¹⁹ Even kinds of media coverage that criticize xenophobia against the Pontian Greeks replicate the masculine image of Pontian men: "But until that help comes, [i.e., when the Paphian society accepts the Pontians] the many Greek Pontians living on Agapinoros Street will *always look over their shoulder* as you walk past the pavement *where they sit under the shade of the trees and play cards, and watch their children play*" (Mita, An impossible challenge? Emphasis added).

and social stereotyping are almost always male gendered. This does not mean that only male Greek Pontians experience marginalization. It means that Pontian women, for reasons that will be later explored, are invisible in the media and other public spheres, both as objects of racialization and as targets of integration policies. Pontian migration to Cyprus started in the early '90s. Though most of them were skilled workers, they entered the labour market as unskilled workers in construction (men) and hotel and cleaning services (women). Greek Pontians were the first group of migrants to settle in ethnically homogeneous inner city down trodden residential areas. Their geographic concentration in low-income neighbourhoods combined with the closed character of their community and the locals' fear that Pontians were displacing Cypriot workers from their jobs rendered Greek Pontians vulnerable to xenophobic and multiple forms of racialization. Stereotyped by national and local (most frequently) media as "criminals," "drug addicts," "drug dealers", "belligerent", "thieves"—stereotyping statements about Pontians have often been reiterated by politicians and police leadership—Greek Pontians have been treated with xenophobia and racist hatred by Greek Cypriots.²⁰ Casting racial stigma and attributing social stereotypes to Greek Pontians has been intertwined with a harassing questioning of their authenticity as Greeks. Pontians originally migrated to Greece from Russia and Georgia as Greek re-patriates, and soon after some of them migrated from Greece to Cyprus. There is a strong belief that many Pontians got Greek passports either for political reasons or under false premises (i.e., claiming to be Greek without being Greek). Questions about the legality of their passports and the authenticity of their Greekness are often conflated with questions about their right to be in Cyprus and eruptions of xenophobic nationalist unrest against everybody who is not a "real Greek". The beleaguering questioning of the Greek Pontians' Greekness is often intertwined with a racializing discourse²¹ but also practices of discipline and violence which reduce Pontians to bare life, literally (as the event described below) and metaphorically (bare life is a term used by Giorgio Agamben (1998) to refer to humanity stripped of its political life through practices of bio-politics). We cite this event of police violence as it shows how through practices of racialization and state disciplining the contested Greek Pontian identity is also framed as Pontian Masculinity/ Russian Pontian Masculinity at risk. Male representatives of Pontian organizations have often accused the police of using the unorthodox methods to catch out 'fake' Greeks who passed themselves off as ethnic Greeks to obtain coveted Greek passports. Poursanides, president of the Federation of Greek Pontians in Paphos, had alleged several times that police had rounded up youths for the purposes of inspecting their genitals and detecting those circumcised (i.e., Moslems).²²

²⁰ Paphos DIKO deputy Nicos Pittokopitis had even demanded that the government deported all Pontians with a criminal record. Deputy Police Chief Soteris Charalambous had stated that they were guests, and that they were only tolerated by society. His comments were also echoed by the Paphos police Chief, Demitris Christodoulou who, on television, warned Pontian Greeks after violent clashes with police, that they were treading a fine line (Alex Mita An impossible challenge? Can Paphos accept the Pontians? *Cyprus Mail*, July 4, 2004).

²¹ Commenting on the increased numbers of foreign workers in the Paphos area, MP Nikos Pittokopitis stated: "All this has created the problem of displacement of the local workforce, which has been left unemployed. And beyond this, especially with the Russian citizens of many races who have secured Greek passports either legally or otherwise, a ghetto has been created" (Martin Hellicar, Ministers back three month freeze on work permits for foreigners, *Cyprus Weekly*, July 13, 1999.).

²² The allegations were made by the president of the Federation of Greek Pontians, Omiros Poursanides, in an interview with *Alithia* newspaper on Sunday. "Do you know what the police do in Paphos, they round up 15 to 20 people, take them to an isolated beach area, and take down their trousers to check if they've been circumcised," Poursanides claimed in the interview. "I was asked by the Paphos police chief if there were any Muslims among us. What am I supposed to say? I'm tired of the same questions," said the Pontian spokesman. The police has been

2.2.3. Refugee and asylum seeking women

According to the latest UN Statistics, Cyprus has 924 registered refugees, with another 12,508 asylum seekers awaiting examination of their claims (Global trends, 2006). There are no gender disaggregated data available at this point and we do not know exactly how many of these refugee and asylum seekers are women and girls.²³ Several Asylum seekers (mostly families) have been settled in the Kofinou camp which is located three Km away from Kofinou village. Kofinou is located on middle of the Highway Nicosia-Limassol, and it is quite far from any major urban or industrial area. The residents of the camp are stuck, marginalized and unemployed, waiting for the state to complete the complicated and lengthy procedure of examining their asylum claim. According to the same UN Statistics, Cyprus ranks first among the countries who have the lengthiest examination period and the lowest approval period (for 2006, the refugee status recognition rate was 0.4, with total recognition rate 1.4). At the start of 2006 there were 1,770 applications pending. During 2006 2,615 persons applied and the total number of decisions was 2,110. 7 applicants were recognized refugees, with 20 more recognized for other reasons (hum). 1,852 applications were rejected with 231 others otherwise closed 231. The number of applications pending at the end of 2006 were 2,275 (28% increase).

Most asylum seekers are illegal migrants who enter the Republic from various spots of the Green Line or by boats. These illegal migrants are, in most cases, families. Not all asylum seeker women, however, are members of families. Some asylum seeker women are students who original come to Cyprus with student visas to attend private tertiary colleges. Some others are women from Asian countries who are admitted with domestic worker work visas and apply for asylum either when their contract (and period of max stay) expires or when they "run away" from their jobs (and their employers) because of domestic violence, exhausting work load, or other reasons. Asylum protection policy focuses on families and often assumes that women asylum seekers are applying for asylum as dependent family members. The framing of the typical asylum seeker as a male, accompanied or not accompanied by his family, is likely to eclipse from social policy in general and economic and employment integration policy in particular the social characteristics and needs of single women and single mothers.

The major problem for asylum seeking women is isolation, poverty and uncertainty. For those who live in the Kofinou camp, employment seems to be an impossible choice since daily survival and care of the children becomes a daily priority. There are other asylum seeking women, however, some of them single mothers, who live in inner city areas, in overcrowded apartments, without any access to welfare subsidies or employment. Even if they get work permits, these asylum seeking women cannot get jobs because the permits are usually given for sectors of the economy which are inaccessible to them (either because they are "male jobs" or because the place of employment is very far from the place of residence). Several women with asylum seeker status who were informally interviewed during this report were uncertain about their legal status and seemed to have no understanding of the

denying any involvement in such practices (Charlie Charalambous, Police deny checking Pontians for circumcision, *Cyprus Mail*, July 13, 1999.).

²³ The Asylum Office of the Republic of Cyprus was contacted directly to inquire about gender disaggregated date. No such data are currently available.

bureaucratic procedures they were involved in though they were committed to following up these procedures religiously on a daily basis. Awaiting for the verdict of the next scheduled meeting with an officer in the Asylum Office, the Labour Office or the Welfare Services seemed to be the only sign of certainly bestowing meaning to their precarious life. Even if the granting of asylum seeker status provides legality of temporary residence, the needs of daily survival force these women to move to a twilight zone between legality and illegality. Forced to secure daily subsistence, they often work illegally part time (either because they work in sectors of economy which are not covered by their special work permits, or because they work part time for illegal employers), live in apartments with illegal migrants and try to stay invisible as much as possible.

2.3. Migration Policies and analysis from a gender specific perspective

Migration policy is regulated to a great extent by the following instruments: the Migration Law, decisions by the Ministerial Council and by the Interministerial Committee on Migration and the Rules decided between the government and the Social Partners (Employers Unions and Employees Unions). Below, the following policy documents are presented and analyzed from a gender equality perspective:

- Aliens and Immigration Law 2002 and 2007
- Ministerial Council decision No. 33.210 dated 15/3/1990
- Criteria and procedures for granting of approval for work permit to Third country migrants
- Supreme Court Decision, *Cresencia Cabotaje Motilla vs Republic of Cyprus*, January 21 2008.

2.3.1. Immigration Legislation

The Aliens and Immigration (Amending) Law 2002 (CAP 105 2 of 1972, 54 of 1976, 50 of 1988, 197 of 1989, 100 (I)/ 1996, 43 (I)/1997, 14(I)/ 1998, 22(I)/2001 and 164 (I)/2001), with some other minor amendments, has been the basic Law until the end of 2007. Critical remarks on Cyprus's migration policy by the Commission have often been cited by human rights NGOs in order to advocate for the reform of migration law and the development of migrant integration policies. The fact remains though that EU remarks are focused on migration control rather than migrant rights and most often they reinforce rather than undermine the conflation of migration policy with border control policies. The Cyprus Migration Report 2003 remarks that the Migration Law had been characterised by various parties as outdated and cites the comments of "the European authorities" who stated at the end of 2003, in the context of evaluations of Cyprus' Accession progress, that:

In the area of migration, Cyprus still needs to fully align with the *acquis* as regards in particular, legislation on *long-term residents*. In this context, Cyprus should accelerate the adoption of amendments to the Aliens and Immigration Regulations. Cyprus is taking action to conclude readmission agreements, however further improvement is required, in particular with regard to neighbouring countries. Administrative structures are in place but a coherent training system for all migration services needs to be continued as regards in particular *the fight against illegal employment* (*Cyprus Migration Report 2003*: 8; emphasis added).

Migration Law was amended, after extended re-drafting of the Bill and continuous parliamentary debates, in the beginnings of 2007 (published in the Official Newspaper of the Republic February 14 2007). The new Migration Law, here forth cited as Migration Law 2007, harmonizes Cyprus Migration law with the following EU Directives and EU Frame Decisions:

- Directive 2003/86/EC of the Council of 22 September 2003 on the right to Family re-unification
- Directive 2003/109/EC of the Council of 25 November 2003 on the residence status of Long-Term Third Country Nationals
- Directive 2002/90/EC of the Council of 28 November 2002 on the assistance to illegal entry, passage and residence
- Directive 2003/110/EC of the Council of 25 November 2003 on repatriation and
- Frame Decision of 28 November 2002 on the reinforcement of the legal frame for the prevention of illegal migration

Of these amendments, the regulation of procedures for granting long-term residence status to migrants residing for more than five years was the most anxiously awaited by migrants legal reform.

In harmonization with Council Directive 2003/109/EC, Migration Law of 2007 defines criteria and procedures for the acquisition of long-term residence status. According to the Cyprus Migration Law of 2007, eligible for applying are third-country nationals (including family members of European Union citizens not covered by the Right of Union Citizens and their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the Republic Law No. 7(I)/2007), who have resided legally and continuously within the controlled areas by the Government of the Republic for five years prior to the submission of the relevant application and who posses valid residence permits.

Many female migrants and migrant support groups had long being expecting for this change as it would provide relative employment security for the big number of domestic workers , second, a springboard for securing labour and civic rights for this category of workers.

However, the harmonization of the Migration Law with Directive 2003/86/EC and Directive 2003/109/EC has not brought up the significant policy changes expected by migrants and migrant support groups. We can cite two reasons for this. First, it is not Migration Law but Ministerial Council Decisions and other Decisions and Rules developed by the executive branch of the Government in coordination with Employers and Labour Unions which frame migration policies. In fact, the most binding policy instruments operate at the level of the "state of exemption" and often bypass laws on gender equality and non discrimination (examples discussed below). Second, migration is framed by most relevant policies as temporary and measures are taken to secure that the status of migrants from third countries remains temporary, thus exempting them rights for long term immigrants but also exempting the government of Cyprus from the obligation to promote the integration of long term immigrants (in other words, no need for such a policy because long term stay is construed as a legal impossibility).

2.3.2. Ministerial Council decision No. 33.210 dated 15/3/1990

Ministerial Council decision No. 33.210 dated 15/3/1990 seems to be the most influential documents in terms of framing migration policy. This Decision (still in place) defines the sectors of economic activity open to migrant labour. The Department of Labour examines applications from employers for the employment of foreigners, "for the satisfaction of pressing, short term needs in the labour market, in certain economic fields and occupations" (http://www.mlsi.gov.cy/mlsi/dl/dl.nsf/dmlgeneralinf_en/dmlgeneralinf_en?OpenDocument).

Two sectors of migrant employment not included in this list are domestic work/care and entertainment/prostitution. Contracts for these two sectors of employment are also exempted from the overall frame, since they are drafted by the Migration department and not by the Labour Office. The exception of the two female sectors of migrant employment from this Decision pegs several questions. Why entertainment/prostitution and domestic care are not designated as fields of employment? If the existence of "pressing, short term needs" is the determining factor for designating the specific labour market sectors, why the selection of sectors has not been labour needs may have changed given their short term character? In other words, why sectors with short term labour force need became permanent migrant sectors of employment?

By exempting domestic work/care from the sectors with labour shortage, the Ministerial Council Decision repeats and further normalizes the association of domestic work and care with unpaid female labour. As unpaid Cypriot women domestic work and care labour become foreign woman labour, the latter inherits some of the characteristics of the former: low status, uninsured, exploitative labour. Furthermore, new characteristics come to add to this sector as domestic work becomes migrant women labour and dark woman labour.

The gender perspective helps us question the very rationale for framing migration as import of temporary migrants for the coverage of short term labour shortage. The very characteristics of the sectors where short-term migrants are employed change significantly as the availability of temporary migrant labour becomes a permanent resource. In the case of domestic work, the formation of the sector, its characteristics (low pay, the range of diverse/ endless duties etc) and the demand followed rather than anteceded the influx of foreign labour. In other words, migration of female migrant workers from Asian countries did not take place because there was a need to fill up labour shortages in a formal employment sector. Rather, the availability of cheap female migrant labour created the demand among households for hiring a "domestic". The very term "domestic" («οικιακή βοηθός», «κοπέλα») was introduced after the flow of this kind of female migrant labour started. Before, some households hired Cypriot women cleaners on a part-time/ hourly basis and the arrangement of stay-in domestic cleaner was unthinkable. The availability of female, migrant, black labour contributed to the institutionalization of the stay-in arrangement in various ways. Being female, single (i.e., without a family living with them in Cyprus) and black, they could (i.e., made to) "fit" in the order of the domestic on a twenty-four hour basis without disturbing the normative universe of the nuclear family. In ordinary circumstances, the Cypriot family could not live on with an-other women amongst them. This other women, however, was Other: her femininity did not pose a risk to the spousal economy of desire since she was seen as a-sexual; her language was not considered a threat for the national integrity of the home since she was the carer with a zero degree of pedagogical interference, the paradigmatic mothering receptacle (to cite the Platonic metaphor for *khora* from *Timaeus*) receiving others

without participating in the imprinting of forms; her blackness, finally, was constructed as that "irreducible" racial marker of difference on the basis of which new borders would be drawn within the home I order to delineate her space.

2.3.3. Criteria and procedures for the granting of approval for work permit to Third country migrants

The examination of employers' applications for the employment of foreigners is mainly regulated by the Criteria and Procedures agreed between the Social Partners and approved by the Council of Ministers. Moreover, the decisions of the relevant Ministerial Committee on matters of foreign workers are taken into account for the purpose of examining these applications. This Committee has been established on the basis of the decision No. 49641 of the Council of Ministers, on 12/5/99, and is comprised by the Ministers of Interior Affairs, Labour and Social Insurance, Justice and Public Order and Commerce, Industry and Tourism. The Criteria and procedure for the granting of approval for work permits are those agreed between the Social Partners and approved by the Council of Ministers on the 6/12/1991. A basic precondition for the granting of permit for employment of foreign workers is the absence of prospects to meet the specific needs of the employer by local force (Cypriot or European citizens), which will be ascertained following an investigation of the competent service of the Ministry of Labour & Social Insurance.

The Criteria for granting of approval for work permit for Third Country Nationals, as these continue to be in force since 1991, are the following:

- Non availability of suitably qualified local personnel, in order to satisfy the specific needs of the employers.
- Saving and better utilization of the local labour force.
- Improvement of working conditions at the workplace.
- Terms and conditions of employment of foreigners should be the same as those for Cypriots.

In cases where working permits are recommended for the employment of foreigners with special skills and knowledge which Cypriots do not possess, the employer shall be obliged to name a Cypriot who will be trained during the period of the foreigner's employment. Cypriot employers who secure initial approval for the employment of a certain number of foreigners, from the Department of Labour, can then submit an application to the Migration Department for the employment of specific foreigners.

The absence of prospects to meet the specific needs of the employer by local force has not been framed as precondition for the issue of work permits in the case of migrant female workers hired as carers. Typically, the large numbers of female migrant workers from Sri Lanka and Philippines enter Cyprus with "domestic helper" work and residence permits. In reality, however, many of them are working as carers for elderly people, handicapped, persons with special needs, chronically ill people and babies, infants and children. Whether it is the availability of migrant care labour that has eclipsed the welfare state's responsibility for care provision or whether it is because of the "thin" provision of child care and elderly care that the state facilitates the import of foreign care labour is something to be investigated. Today, state child care is limited to the partial support of few state child care centers for age 3 and above (grants-in-aid scheme) and one year of mandatory preschool (age 5-6) education. State supported baby and infant care is not available. After-school child care is

available only in selected full-day schools (until 4 pm). The typical day schedule of a public elementary school lasts from 7.30-1.05, with some school parent councils of municipal councils operating after school child attendance centers (1.05 to 3.00). The idea of the full-day school (i.e., basic curriculum plus an after school program for assisted homework and creative activities) was originally promoted by the Left in the late 1990s as a social support measure for vulnerable groups (the idea was that full day school would take off from parents, mostly mothers, the burden of child care and would enable them to enter the labour market). Beginning in 1999, various kinds of voluntary full day school were implemented on a voluntary basis, the difference among them being the length of after-school stay rather than the actual curriculum. During 2007-2008, the scheme of mandatory full day school was implemented a small number of schools. In some of these schools, the parents opted out and registered their children in other schools, fearing that the full-day scheme would attract migrants families in their educational district, the school would gradually become a minority school and its social and academic status would decline. This year, of the 154 elementary schools candidates for the voluntary full day school scheme, 131 limit the option of after school to kids in grades 4-6 and only 23 schools extend after school to kids grades K-3. Though the problem of after school care and care for preschool kids is one of the most pressing issues for working parents, state provision of quality child care was never framed as a priority either by the state or by the parents. The privatization of child care provision combined with the availability of cheap female migrant care labour has come to influence the way the state and the parents think of child care. In the public discussion on social inclusion none of the policy actors—not even the Left—thematizes the privatization of care provision. Instead, the privatization of care provision is usually framed as decentralization of provision. Although privatization reforms usually implicate the weakening of the state's role, in the case of Cyprus the privatization of child care demands rather than excludes the state's major role. There is a significant modification of the state's role, however. The state role is transformed from provider and/or financer of services to regulator of an exceptional economy of female migrant labour which secures the availability of cheap and flexible care labour. The state exempts domestic labour both from the market needs test and from the authority of the labour office and institutionalizes the precariousness of that otherwise threatening "foreign domestic" woman. The state designates and preserves minimum wages (from the beginning of Asian migration in the mid 90s until 2007 monthly wages for domestics remained fixed to the amount of 150 CYP/256.87 Euro, an amount much lower than the minimum salary). In 2007 a significant increase was proposed by the labour office but this was eventually "trimmed" to 20% by the Ministerial Council, raising monthly wages to 180 CYP/307 Euro (this increase was enforceable only to new contracts, many migrants with old contracts are still paid 150 CYP/256.87 Euro).

2.3.4. Supreme Court Decision, *Cresencia Cabotaje Motilla vs Republic of Cyprus*, January 21 2008

The first migrant to apply for long term status was Cresencia Cabotaje Motilla, a female Filipino domestic worker. The application was submitted before the Migration Law was amended to include articles on long term immigrant residence status. For this reason the application was submitted on grounds of Directive 2003/101/EC (Article 4.1) and not on grounds of the Cyprus Migration Law. The application was submitted on 25.1.2006, after the applicant had completed five years of stay in Cyprus, but also after the deadline for member State Harmonization with Directive 2003/101/EC (23.1.2006) had expired (these details are

significant as they indicate how discontinuities between national and EU migration policies create a liminal space where female migrant workers can find opportunities for legal agency). The application by Cresencia Cabotaje Motilla was rejected and the applicant appealed to the Supreme Court which by its January 21 2008 Decision reconfirmed the rejection of the Application, on the basis that the applicant had originally entered the Republic on a short-term residence and thus, had no intention for permanent residence. In its ruling, the Supreme Court interpreted Directive 2003/101/EC to suggest that granting of long-term residence is limited in cases of temporary residence and state members are allowed to limit, through "formal restrictions", the application of this right for "those categories of aliens who, by virtue of their nature and the defined and limited purpose of their residence, cannot have the possibility/potential of permanent residence which would otherwise create a reasonable expectation of "settlement" and continuation of residence in the spirit of the directive". On the basis of this interpretation of the Directive, the Court re-confirmed the legality of the exclusion of domestic workers as a "category" from the effective application of the Directive:

The Cyprus Republic, in the context of the Directive, has proceeded to such regulations regarding many categories of Third Country Nationals, through its decision submitted to the relevant inter-Ministerial Committee also approved by the Ministerial Council, and which expresses the meaning of "formal restrictions". The case of domestic helpers is one of those categories of Third Country Nationals who are subjected to these regulations. The decision that their residence permit is limited is revealing of the Republic's perception that the nature and purpose of the residence of the internal [sic] domestic helpers, whose permit is actually tied to a specific employer, implicates a specialization and a temporariness of stay which justifies their exception from the general rule.²⁴

This Decision, which in rhetoric appears to be gender neutral, hides the fact that it refers to a specific gender group as well as a specifically feminized job. The ruling, grounding the exception of female domestic migrant workers from the applicability of Directive 2003/101/EC, on the "nature" of the migrants and the "nature" of the job, comes to naturalize and normalize as "migration regulations" gender discrimination as well as discrimination on the basis of national and ethnic origin.

3. Migration in Policies of Gender Equality

3.1. Lack of intersectionality in gender equality policies

Because of the framing of women in social inclusion policies as a homogeneous group, migrant women remain invisible as distinct social and ethnic groups. In several employment and social integration policy documents female migrants are named along with other groups (elderly women, single parent families) as "socially vulnerable groups". The specificity of female migrants' social vulnerability, however, is not analyzed or addressed by specific measurer. We encounter a similar problem in gender equality policy. The National Action Plan for quality between men and Women, 2007-2013, prepared by the National Mechanism

²⁴ Supreme Court Decision, Case No. 673/2006, Cresencia Cabotaje Motilla vs. the Republic of Cyprus, via the Minister of Interior and the Director of Migration and Population registry Office, 21 January 2008 (author's translation).

for Gender Equality (Ministry of Justice and Public Order), refers to migrant women only twice, without presenting any analysis of the intersection of migration and gender. The first instance is in reference to "vulnerable" social groups (the NAP calls for the "improvement of the living conditions and quality of life of women who belong to different and "vulnerable" social categories (single-parent families, elderly women and migrant women. etc) who face increased poverty risk" (Mechanism for Gender Equality, 2007, p. 17) and the second instance is in reference to Policy Actions that promote equal access to social rights for men and women. The proposed actions include "Basic Knowledge Programs for Migrants/Foreigners, especially women, and Learning of the Greek Language, aiming to their smooth inclusion in the Cypriot society" (ibid, p. 42). What is missing in Gender Equality policy is a diagnosis of problems related to the exclusion of women migrants from the legal bind of Gender Equality Laws, a prognosis that bears into consideration the specific kinds of gender discrimination experienced by women migrants and specific actions that promote the gender equality of migrant women. Whereas social inclusion policy is lacking in terms of gender mainstreaming, gender equality policy is lacking in terms of migration mainstreaming. In the next two subsections we explain why some important Gender Equality Laws have limited applicability to forms of exclusion and violence experienced by migrant women and discuss the impact of Anti-discrimination policy bodies on promoting the rights of migrant women.

3.2. Gender equality laws: Why migrant women are exempted from the implementation of these laws

Equal Treatment in Occupation and Employment 2002 (N.205(I)/2002) (Amended by Equal Treatment in Occupation and Employment Law No. 58(I) of 2004 (Harmonizing w/Directives 76/207/EEC and 97/80/EC).

This Law prohibits any direct or indirect discrimination, harassment or instruction to apply discriminatory treatment on the grounds of race or ethnic origin, religion or belief, age or sexual orientation as regards access to employment, vocational guidance/training, working conditions and the terms of employment as well as the capacity of the member in a workers or employees organisations. This Law was passed for purposes of harmonization with Council Directive of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions (76/207/EEC) and Council Directive 97/80/EC of 15 December 1997 on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex. The law aims at the application of the principle of equal treatment for men and women in respect of employment, access to vocational guidance, vocational education and training and the conditions of their provision, including professional development and the conditions and preconditions of dismissal.

Though the Law provides for the appointment of inspectors who will supervise the implementation process, the workplace of many migrant workers is exempted from the 'reach' of these inspectors. In particular, the "home" which constitutes the primary workplace for about 23,000-25,000 female migrant domestic workers in Cyprus, is exempted from the legal bind of this law since inspectors are not allowed to inspect private homes.

Gender equality in regards to conditions and preconditions of dismissal, also covered by this law, has limited applicability to the case of migrant women because of the precarious legality

of their employment. The mutual conditionality of their work permit and residence permit, as well as the strict terms of their contracts (which in many instances are incompatible to many articles of this law) renders them vulnerable to deportation before they have the time and means to file complains for illegal dismissal.

The increased number of complaints filed by housemaids (predominantly Asian female migrants) has not raised any concerns for the applicability of labour rights in the domestic sector. Out of 1082 complaints files in 2000, 619 were complaints by housemaids. In 2001, out of 1310 complaints filed, 656 were complaints by housemaids, and in 2002, out of 1404 complaints files 721 were complaints by housemaids.²⁵ According to the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance, the above mentioned complaints were investigated either directly by the competent Labour Officers at the District Labour Offices, or by the Committee for the examination of Labour Disputes that operates under the presidency of the Migration Officer. No data are provided, however, for the cases when the examination of these complaints was inconclusive.

The Equal Pay between Men and Women for the Same Work or for Work of Equal Value Law, 2002 (L. 177(I)/2002)

This Law harmonizes Cyprus legislation with the provisions of Directive 75/177/EEC, relating to the application of the principle of equal pay between men and women, and Directive 97/80/EC on the burden of proof in cases of discrimination based on sex. The Law provides for the safeguarding of equal pay between men and women for the same work, or for work to which equal value is attributed. The Law also provides for the responsibility of the competent authority to request from employers' and employees' organisations to examine the provisions of existing collective agreements, with a view to revoking, or amending any provisions that directly or indirectly include discrimination based on sex. Furthermore, the Law provides for the appointment of inspectors for the enforcement of the Law, and lays out their duties and powers. The Law also lays down specific criteria for the comparison and evaluation of work of equal value, and also provides for the establishment, and terms of reference of a Committee for the Investigation and Assessment of Work.

As in the case of the previous Law, the applicability of this Law to the case of migrant women is limited for two reasons. First, the workplace of migrant domestic workers is exempted from inspection by the Labour Office Inspectors. Second, the salaries of migrant workers are designated by special contracts (the salary for female migrant domestic workers in Cyprus is 300 Euro, about one half of the minimum salary).

Violence in the Family (Prevention and Protection of Victims) of Laws of 2000 and 2004)

The framing of the Law does not take into consideration changes in familial patterns. Most migrant domestic workers are stay-ins (reside at the same place with their employers and treated as "members of the family"). Sexual violence and other forms of violence experienced by these women in the domestic realm do not count as family violence yet they are forms of domestic violence (the lack of policy on "domestic violence" makes the identification and treatment of such forms of violence even more difficult). Incidents of

²⁵http://www.mlsi.gov.cy/mlsi/dl/dl.nsf/dmlapplication_en/dmlapplication_en?OpenDocument&Start=1&Count=1000&Expand=2

family violence among families of migrants (frequent wife battering and several instances of murder) also remain outside the scope of family violence, both from the perspective of the Greek Cypriot society (they perceive them as incident of ethnic rather than family violence) and from the perspective of the victims themselves. Migrant women victims do not trust state authorities and do not report family violence, since the abuser's conviction would also mean his deportation (or, the victim's deportation too, if she is an irregular/illegal migrant).

Combating Trafficking and Exploitation of Human Beings and Protection of Victims Law (L.87(I)/ 2007)

The Law provides for the protection, compensation and rehabilitation of victims of trafficking, appoints the Director of Welfare services as the Guardian of Victims of Sexual Exploitation. The Law Harmonizes National Law on Trafficking with Council Framework Decision 2002/629/JHA on combating trafficking in human beings of 19 July 2002, and Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-country nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities.

One of the events that sensitized Cypriot society to the "plight" of foreign women employed as artists (καλλιτέχνιδες) was the death of Oxana Rancheva in March 2001. Soon, however, the memory of the event would become bio-degraded by the Cyprus media as another sad story of a woman from an Eastern European country who was caught into the webs of prostitution. Even though gender violence in general and trafficking in particular is a dimension of gender equality policy, trafficking in Cyprus continues to be framed as an issue of prostitution, illegal migration, and sexual exploitation of migrant women from Eastern European countries.

According to a study contacted by AKEA party, the profits from prostitution in the informal economy in the year 2000 exceeded the amount of 40 million CYP. During the year 2005, the office filed 47 charges for living on prostitution profits, sexual exploitation of minors and adults, running prostitution houses, etc., while during the year 2006, 57 more charges were filed. According to a confidential report during the period January 1 1999 to June 23 2004 a total number of 100 cases of prostituting women were filed. According to the same report, for charges to be accepted and cases to be prosecuted, additional testimony ("ένισχυτική μαρτυρία") is required, something which renders the validation of these charges and their prosecution extremely difficult.

Two arguments frequently used to support the view that there is no trafficking in people in Cyprus are: (a) these women come to Cyprus willingly, knowing that they will work as prostitutes and (b) most of them are repatriated to their countries of origin after the end of their contract. What is worrisome is that politicians themselves adopt and reproduce this framing of the issue. Particularly shocking was the public statement of the ex-minister of Justice, Doros Theodorou. Attacking and discrediting the findings of an inquiry by the Ombudswoman's Office, he stated that many young women in Ukraine and Moldavia are anxious to come to Cyprus to work as "artists".. The CEDAW report has also replicated the dominant understanding of trafficking as it adopts the same rhetoric used provided by the Police and the Ministry of Justice.

One of the most crucial parliamentary sessions on the issue of trafficking was the session of October 6 2005 when the Parliamentary Committee on criminality presented a special report on the topic of "prostitution-trafficking." The focus of the discussion during the first part of that session was the down-grading of Cyprus from tier one to tier two in the US Foreign Office Report on Trafficking. The Minister of Justice emphatically rejected the position that it is possible that there is "trafficking" in Cyprus and disagreed with the views of the Ombudswoman's Report. In the following Parliamentary session, October 13 2005, which discussed the Report by the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, the discontinuities and dissonant opinions on trafficking became more visible. The Police and the Ministry of Justice approach the issue as a case of prostitution and they argue that there is no trafficking in Cyprus. The Director of the Migrations Department, the Ombudswoman and sever MPs define trafficking as a problem of violation of Human Rights and argue that there is a big problem of trafficking in Cyprus. The Director of the Migration Department argued that the legal frame on trafficking was outdated, rooted in legal frame of the British colonial period, and pointed out that one of its major weakness of the is that "the affected women" (the term "victims" was not used) do not testify because of the lack of trust, fear and the dependency relation between them and their employers. In the same Parliamentary Session, the representative of the Police argued that that there is prostitution of women but no trafficking and cited Police Statistics according to which since February 10 2003 there charges were files for only three cases.

The most comprehensive critique of the anti-trafficking policy and the Combating Trafficking and Exploitation of Human Beings and Protection of Victims Law of 2007 from a gender equality perspective has been presented by The Mediterranean Institute of Gender Studies (MIGS). In the Report Mapping the Realities of Trafficking in Women for the purpose of sexual exploitation in Cyprus (October 2007), MIGS maps the dimensions of trafficking in women in Cyprus, exposes the involvement of the government in the problem, and argues that the combating of trafficking must be framed as an issue of gender equality.

3.3. Gender Equality Bodies and their approach to the intersectionality of gender and migration

The Ombudsman Office, founded in 1991, has the authority to investigate issues of gender inequality, discrimination and racism. The authority of this Office was established through a series of laws: the Commissioner for Administration Amendment Law 10(1)/95, the Combating of Racism and Other Discrimination (Commissioner) Law of 2004 and the Commissioner for Administration (Amendment) Law of 2004). The Ombudsman's Office has been at large the most competent mechanism for promoting gender equality in Cyprus and combating racism and discrimination against migrants.

Up until 2004, the Ombudswoman's Office combined authorities relevant to enforcing/monitoring gender equality with authorities relevant to enforcing/monitoring other equality issues. Since 2004, issues of gender equality are dealt with by the Equality Authority. Since 2004, two new Equality Bodies have been operating under the administrative umbrella of the Ombudswoman's Office:

- (a) The Authority against Racism (under the administration of Aristos Chartas)
- (b) The Equality Authority (under the administration of Eliza Savvidou)

We must note that the scope of the Equality Authority is not limited to issues of gender equality. The Authority also examines complaints regarding discrimination in employment on grounds of national and ethnic and origin, etc. The Authority for Combating Racism and Discrimination, on the other hand, has examined a number of complaints which often involved intersecting inequalities. Most complaints submitted by migrants are classified as cases of discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin or religion, even though several of these cases are also cases of gender discrimination (for example, a woman of Greek-Pontian origin submitted a complaint to the Authority against the decision of the Ministry of Health to reject her application for fertility treatment subsidy on grounds of not being a Cypriot citizen). A review of the Authority's Annual Report for the year 2005 suggests that such cases are dealt with as cases of ethnic or racial discrimination and not as cases of intersecting (gender-and-race) inequalities.

It is also important to note that the statistical analysis of complaints submitted to the Antidiscrimination Authority (included in the Annual Report) classify complainants according to Ethnic/National origin (i.e., Turkish Cypriots, Migrants/EU Nationals and Greek Cypriot Nationals) but not according to gender. Also, if we examine the cases examined by the Equality Authority for the same period (Equality Authority Annual Report 2005), we will see that only 28% were cases of discrimination on the grounds of sex (5% on grounds of language discrimination, 15% Disability/Special Needs, 17% age, 19% Race or ethnic origin, etc).

4. Intercultural Interaction as a policy objective

4.1. Why immigrant categories and migration control policies are incompatible with the ideal of intercultural interaction

Cyprus is one of the few EU countries where the majority of non-nationals come from other EU Member States, at 55.8% (Niessen and Huddleston, 2007). The increased inflows of immigrants from Non-EU countries as well as the mobility across the Green Line, have been the catalysts for intercultural contact, both exchange and violence. Intercultural interaction itself, however, has not been framed as a policy objective, with the exemption of intercultural education. The latter, until very recently, had been understood in terms of assimilation (social and cultural).

The absence of policy on intercultural interaction can be attributed to two reasons: first, the overall framing of migration as temporary migration and, second, the framing of migration as import and regulation of flexible and cheap labour. To the extent cheap labour requires precariousness of labour, policies for the regulation of migration have kept migrants "in place", i.e., in segregated and racialized forms of employment, rather than facilitating interaction, exchange and transformation.

Government reports on anti-discrimination policies, social integration etc, most frequently refer to flexible labour policies and temporary workers rather than to migration and migrants, as in the Report of the Republic of Cyprus against Discrimination (2003): "As from the middle 1990's a more flexible policy was adopted regarding the temporary employment of foreign workers, in order to alleviate the problem of labour shortages mainly in the sectors of tourism, construction, manufacturing and agriculture." This framing of migrants as temporary and the de-association of migration policy (as a labour marker tactics) from integration policy

(a social process) is explicitly stated in the Second Annual Report on Migration and Integration: "Given the low number of long-term immigrants and recognised refugees, the Republic of Cyprus has not yet adopted an integration policy" (SEC(2006) 892, p. 8).

The absence of immigrant integration policy is also related to the problematic categorization of immigrants as short-term and long-term. The central European experience of migration suggests that short-term migrants are eventually becoming long-term migrants and for this reason the timing and framing of integration policies are now reconsidered. Whereas before migration and integration were treated as separate and consecutive phases, the Tampere Council framing of migration and integration as intertwined and inseparable processes stressed the need to start integration as early as admission. Though the distinction between short-term and long-term migrants is critiqued and reconsidered at the EU level in regards to integrating migrants in the labour economy and society, the distinction is re-confirmed at the national level, in regards to granting long-term residence rights and, consequently, having to also grant increased social and political rights to migrants. The interpretation of the Cyprus Migration Law (Migration Law of 2007) by the Cyprus Supreme Court elaborates this problem. Though the Law has been fully harmonized with EU policies pursuant Directives on Long Term Residence of Third Country National residents and Reunification of families, the Court finds the state's refusal to grant long-term residence status to migrants who satisfy the terms and conditions of the Law (basically, have stayed in Cyprus for a period more than 5 years) valid. The Court's Decision, which has now established a legal precedent, is grounded on the argument that their original entry visa was a temporary visa and thus these migrants were admitted exactly because they were not "intending to stay". Whereas legal definitions of migration and migrants conflate agency with intentionality, the mobility and transformation of identities (from temporary to long term, from migrant to ethnic minority) suggests that intentionality is unsuitable as a theoretical term to describe the kinds of agency developed in migration and because of migration.

This framing of agency as deliberation and intentionality also dominates the understanding and policy planning of interculturality. Intercultural contacts between migrants and nationals are often emphasized as essential for securing migrant integration and social harmony and combating racism and ghetocization. This view of intercultural contacts, however, disregards the fact that intercultural processes are dynamic and through these identities and communities change (even new cultures and communities and new identities are created). Thus it is not intentions that define the agency of migrants but, the other way around: agency and subjectivity are redefined as migrants and nationals find them selves amidst new life choice while intentionality remains contingent upon a politics of mobility and cultural change.

The next two sections of this chapter outline and critically analyze the ideology and practices of intercultural policy in Cyprus in regards to two cases, the cases of a particular group of immigrants (Greek Pontians) and the case of a particular sector of policy (intercultural education in schools).

4.2. The reception of Greek Pontians (Ellinopontioi): Greekness as supplement and integration policy as pleonasm

Despite the significant cultural and language difference of the Greek Pontians who immigrated to Cyprus during the early '90s, their social integration and issues of intercultural interaction between the Greek Cypriot society and immigrants were not addressed as policy issues. Two kinds of ideology served to legitimize the in-flow of Pontians and to eclipse question on migrant integration: first, the ideology of mother land Greece and, second, the ideology of "pallinostisi" (the exiles' nostalgia for return, home, i.e., repatriation). If Greek Cypriots had been traditionally received by mother land,²⁶ Cyprus, the "daughter", also had a responsibility to receive incoming flows from Greece. In other words, even though the Greekness of Greek Pontians was contested, their reception was still mediated as a patriotic duty to share Greece's burden of incoming flows. The ideology of pallinostisi (repatriation) also provided legitimacy for state regulation of these incoming-flows. In the official national discourse, Pontians were reconstructed as long-time Greek exiles who were, finally, returning "home". What was at stake in this construction was not strategic essentialism (Pontians as Greeks) in the service of social integration but the image of the Nation which was being refigured as enduring and limitless, irreducible to the geopolitical borders of the state. In this case, the ideology of *Megali Ellada* (Hellenism non-territorialized to the central body of the Greek state) converged with the ideology of irredentism (of the periphery/peripheries). Cyprus 'was' Greek/Greece, thus the move from Greece to Cyprus was a continuation of that return (thus treated as an internal population move rather than as a migration).

The migration of Greek Pontians also coincided with the signing of "Unified Defence Doctrine"²⁷ (*Ενιαίο Αμυντικό Δόγμα*) in November of 1993 between the governments of Cyprus and Greece.²⁸ The application of the term "pallinostisi" to the "return" of Greek Pontians was a migration policy borrowed from Greece. In the Cypriot context, the term "pallinostisi" had been originally used to describe the repatriation of Cypriot emigrants (including second generation) who returned home (from UK, Australia, South Africa, etc.) In fact, by Decisions of the Ministerial Council of Ministers the Cypriot government has approved several benefits for these repatriates (rent allowance, free health and medical care during the first year of repatriation and educational allowance for the children of repatriates who attend

²⁶ Before the foundation of the University of Cyprus, most Greek Cypriots studied in Greece. After 1974, many Greek Cypriot refugees migrated to Greece.

²⁷ Under the terms of the "Unified Defence Doctrine" agreed by Papandreou and President Clerides of Cyprus in 1993, Greece was committed to consider a reason for war with Turkey any Turkish attack against free Cyprus. In the context of this Doctrine, the Andreas Papandreou air base near Paphos was built by Greece to provide air cover to Cyprus in the event of hostilities with Turkey.

²⁸ Racial markers of Greek Pontian identity are almost always male gendered. With Greek Pontians being pictured by national and local (most frequently) media as "criminals," "drug addicts," "drug dealers", "belligerent", "thieves", masculine frames of delinquency have contributed to the eclipse of a Pontian female subjectivity. The beleaguering questioning of Pontians' Greekness has also been intertwined with the racialized questioning of their Masculinity. Male representatives of Pontian organizations had accused the police of using unorthodox methods to catch out 'fake' Greeks who passed themselves off as ethnic Greeks in order to obtain coveted Greek passports. Poursanides, president of the Federation of Greek Pontians in Paphos, alleged several times that police had rounded up youths for the purposes of inspecting their genitals and detecting those circumcised, i.e., Moslems (*Alithia* newspaper, Sunday, July 11 1999).. "Do you know what the police do in Paphos, they round up 15 to 20 people, take them to an isolated beach area, and take down their trousers to check if they've been circumcised," Poursanides claimed in the interview. "I was asked by the Paphos police chief if there were any Muslims among us. What am I supposed to say? I'm tired of the same questions" (Charlie Charalambous, Police deny checking Pontians for circumcision, *Cyprus Mail*, July 13, 1999).

private English language schools).²⁹ In a report entitled "Social and Employment problems faced by Repatriates" (dated 22.5.2007, the Parliamentary Committee has proposed further integration measures such as the granting of social retirement pension, increase of school fee allowance from £450.000 to £700.000, etc.).³⁰

In order to legitimize the emigration of Greek Pontians, the ideological limits of "pallinostisi" were expanded to include the "return" of Greek Pontians (Greek Pontians, however, are not eligible for the social inclusion benefits announced for Repatriates by the Ministerial Council). The first state body to invoke intercultural education was the Repatriates Service (Ipiresia Pallinostounton), an independent office under the President Office, and not the Ministry of Education (of course, this also served the Ministry's deliberate blindness to the demographic changes in Greek Cypriot schools and the need to accommodate the cultural and language diversity of students). The paradox with the "reception" of Pontians as repatriates was that the ideological use of repatriation was disavowed for Pontians and reserved for state use only. The state used this rhetoric, first, to legitimize the increased flow of cheap migrant labour (which created unrest among Cypriot low-skill workers) and, second, to defuse claims by the "TRNC" that the "Greek Administration" used inflows of Greek Pontians to change the demographic proportion of Greeks and Turks on the island. When Pontians themselves articulate the ideology of pallinostisi in order to counter Greek Cypriots' discrediting of their Greekness and defend themselves against racist attacks, this tactic is perceived more as the presentation of a fake identity and not as a politics. For these reasons, even though the immigration of Greek Pontians from Greece to Cyprus was taken into consideration in the statistical calculation of net migration, it was not thematized in social policy as a process of migration. Furthermore, the concentration/ghetocization of Greek Pontians in specific urban areas was not framed as a problem of migrant integration, incidents of racism against Pontians students in schools were never framed as a problem of racial violence, and the invisibility of Pontian women was never talked about in the context of gender equality policy.

The combined absence of social integration policy and policy on intercultural contact has led to the increased racialization of Pontian students and the normalization of multiple forms of exclusion and marginalization in schools. Below, we cite two particular "episodes" that illustrate how gender discrimination and racialization intersect in the case of migrant students (the exact wording of the teachers has been preserved since these episodes are not "specimen" of intercultural interaction" but representations which are already layered by the cultural codifications and interpretations of the teachers who describe these episodes).³¹

²⁹ http://www.parliament.cy/parliamentgr/008_03b/23_06_008_04_473.htm

³⁰ http://www.parliament.cy/parliamentgr/008_05c/008_05_2223.htm

³¹ These codifications have been produced by secondary education teachers during their one-year pedagogical training. During the academic year 2007-2008, the University of Cyprus took over the pre-service pedagogical training program for prospective secondary education teachers. This is an one-year training program and it includes coursework and a teacher-practicum internship program. Some teachers register in this course as pre-service teachers and some (those already teaching in public schools) as in-service teacher students. As part of their evaluation for a 6 week module on Intercultural Education, the teachers had to provide a "thick description" of an intercultural interaction ("episode") that took place in their school and implicated forms of violence and/or cultural misrecognition (the in-service teachers recorded episodes from their regular classrooms whereas pre-service teachers from the classrooms where they did their training). About 300 different episodes were recorded and analyzed during the first year of the Program. The ones cited here are some of these episodes, which focus on Greek Pontian migrant students in public Greek-Cypriot classrooms. The names of students and schools have been modified. Gymnasium refers to grade 7-9 (age 12-14) and Lyceum to grades 10-12 (age 15-17).

(a) *"Oxana the Russian-Pontian"*

This episode was recorded in a central Gymnasium of Paphos, during the ICT class. There was a technical problem with the printer and, while trying to fix the problem, the teacher opened the ink cartridge and spilled the ink on the floor.

Immediately, I asked the students who was willing to go to the janitors' room and bring a mop to clean up the floor. Then, to my surprise, most of the students spontaneously pointed at Oxana, a blond girl from Russia, and they said, "Oxana the Russian-Pontian." When I asked, "Why?" they said, "Because her mother works as a cleaner at a hotel and will know very well how to use the broom and mop the floor."

(b) *"Spartak and 'boyish' competition for distinction"*

This episode was recorded in a central Gymnasium of Larnaka during the school year 2004-2005, the year the narrator was appointed in public schools. Besides the Greek Cypriot students, many children from Russia were enrolled in the particular school since it is located in the city center where many families of migrants reside in order to be close to their workplace.

One day, during the Math lesson, the teacher ("η καθηγήτρια") announced to the whole class that Spartak got the highest grade in the test they had. Since he was a foreigner ("Καθότι αλλοδαπός"), some of his male peers got jealous and told him in a warning tone that 'they would talk about it during the break'. The boys' intentions were clear; they were intending to attack him not being able to bear the idea ("μη αντέχοντας στην ιδέα") that a foreigner ("ένας αλλοδαπός") is better than them. The teacher noticed what happened and in her attempt to bring them back to order ("να τους συμμορφώσει"), made remarks to those involved and continued the lesson.

The bell ring and the children exited the classroom. Spartak and his friend Annis from the next door classroom were off to the canteen. There his male peers were waiting for him and started calling names on him ("να τον βρίζουν"). He was lucky though that the teacher reported to the staff room on what had happened in the classroom, and when the bell rang several gym teachers made their way to the school yard. As soon as they realized what was happening, due to the loud voices, they went close to the children to advise them and prevent any possible injuries.

After this, the Principal called the children to her office and to inquire on the incident. She forced the Greek Cypriot students to apologize to Spartak for their conduct, explaining to them that all children are equal, and made it clear that she did not want such incident to repeat in the school.

4.3. The Framing of Intercultural Education: From assimilation to "boutique multiculturalism"³²

What can schools do for children like Oxana and Spartak? Intercultural education in Cyprus was originally understood as a tool to help "us" deal with "foreign students" (the term used in educational discourse is "allodapoi", i.e., aliens). As the problem of "allodapoi" became

³² The term boutique multiculturalism is cited from the title of Stanley Fish's article "Boutique multiculturalism, or why liberals are incapable of thinking about hate speech" (Fish 1997).

diagnosed as a problem of students who do not speak the language of instruction, i.e., Greek, migrant students became re-framed as from "allogosoi" to "alloglossoi" (i.e., speaking a foreign language). Framed as a prognosis for this problem, intercultural education was basically understood as teaching Greek to foreigners. Implicitly, intercultural interaction was understood as a spontaneous process which would take off as soon as the migrant students were mainstreamed. Another reason why "integration of migrant students" and not "intercultural interaction" was framed as the objective of school policy was the understanding of multiculturalism and cultural difference as a migrant condition rather than a social and cultural condition. For this reason, the migrant student and not the multicultural class, the cultural difference of the "other" and not ethnicity and ethnic borders became the focus of educational policy. In other words, intercultural education was in practice perceived as cultural education. As the educational episodes which as cited in the previous subsection suggest, however, intercultural interaction continues to be a problematic terrain even after Oxana and Spartak have learned Greek. In fact, these episodes suggest that processes of racialization intersect with processes of gendering to frame migrant students as other (inferior, dangerous, subservient) particularly in cases when the borders between native students and migrant others are destabilized through the educational integration of migrants.

From 2001, the year the Ministry of Education of Cyprus acknowledged officially the "phenomenon" of multiculturalism in schools, to 2008, the year "intercultural education" was framed as the year-long educational aim, the discourse on intercultural education has remained focused on the migrant "object". At the beginning of the school year 2001-2002 the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Cyprus used for first time the rhetoric of multicultural education in order to acknowledge the "becoming multicultural" of the Cypriot society and to announce a series of measures taken in response to the ensuing educational needs. In acknowledging multiculturalism as a new social reality, this response was also delineating the present from a presumably mono-cultural (i.e., Greek Orthodox) past:

Cyprus, besides its serious political problem, finds itself today in the whirlwind of socioeconomic developments. The Cypriot society, which until recently was a relatively homogeneous society with Greek Orthodox population, has been experiencing during the last decade the consequences of mass influx of alien workers and Greek-Pontioi expatriates from the previous USSR (Ministry of Education, Memorandum, November 3 2001).

"Multicultural Education," understood as a social inclusion measure for addressing the needs of "multicultural society", focused primarily on the teaching of Greek to migrant students:

This measure [Multicultural Education] aims at the smooth integration of foreign-language speaking children into the educational system of Cyprus and not at their absorption. The objective of the education offered is to provide enhanced and diversified programmes for learning the Greek language to children of repatriated and immigrant families for effective communication and smooth integration in society and to protect them against all forms of racial discrimination and social exclusion tendencies. The Centres of Further Education cover this need by offering afternoon lessons (Social Inclusion Report, 2006: 24-25).

Besides teaching Greek language to "alloglossoi" (i.e., non-Greek speaking students), intercultural education was also framed as a policy of "social inclusion" for disadvantaged children. Towards this direction, the Ministry of Education has adopted the measure of Educational Priority Zones (EPZs). This measure aims at reducing inequalities for pupils attending schools in disadvantaged areas with an increased proportion of immigrants: "The EPZ promote the qualitative democratisation of educational opportunities and pedagogical

conditions of success for all children". (Social Inclusion NAP, 2006). Currently three EPZ are in operation, covering 17 schools.

Whereas in 2001 the Ministry's use of the term "multicultural" was very cautious, almost reticent, by the year 2008 the use of the term became so generous that multiculturalism came to cover every ethnic other, every inter-cultural encounter, every migration which the Republic of Cyprus was willing to accommodate within its national narrative. The National Strategy Plan for the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue 2008, submitted in response to the Restricted Call for Proposals by the Culture Unit of the Directorate General for Education and Culture of the Commission, "was composed bearing in mind the specific features of the Cypriot Society which bestow to it multicultural characteristics" (Action Plan by the National Coordination Body of Cyprus, September 14 2007). Among these social features, the National Strategy cites:

The existence of the constitutionally recognized communities and religious groups (Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Armenians, Maronites, Latins), the contact with the English culture during the period of British Rule and because of the presence of British bases on the island, the migration experience of Cypriots themselves, and the reception of foreign migrants in our days, tourism, bordering with Middle East and the repercussions of relevant political events such as the reception and hospitality of refugees from Lebanon, many young people studying in universities abroad, Cyprus EU accession. During the last few years, Cypriot society experiences an utterly new reality, mostly in the school environment (ibid; author's translation).³³

The first two first goals listed by the National Strategy are:

- a) All the people of Cyprus, local and immigrants should realise the importance of intercultural dialogue in their everyday life and be willing to participate in it positively.
- b) The immigrants should get familiar with the basic characteristics of the local culture whereas the natives should get to know the characteristics of the different immigrant groups. In this way they will be able to understand, tolerate and cooperate with each other.³⁴

These two goals embody the dominant understanding of intercultural education as it has been developing across the elementary schools of Cyprus during the last few years, a combination of moralizing discourse on tolerance and a child-centered approach to the

³³ This is an exact translation of the Greek text as posted on the website of the Ministry of Education and Culture of Cyprus. The text of the National Strategy as posted on the official EU website of the "European Year of Intercultural Dialogue" is quite different, narrativizing the last hundred year of multicultural becoming rather than outlining social features, while emphasizing the hospitable response of Cypriots people:

The Cypriots are familiar with living with people of other cultures not only because of the tourist character of the country but also on account of the immigration of many locals to more economically developed countries in the past. Being neighbours with the Arabs and giving shelter to the refugees who left Lebanon during the civil war and the several crises in their country gave the locals the chance to know some aspects of the Arab culture. During the last decade the presence on the island of immigrants from Easter European and Asian countries is greatly noticed. These immigrants work in hotels and restaurants, as sanitary employees and domestic assistants and in many other occupations (available online: http://www.interculturaldialogue2008.eu/fileadmin/downloads/documents/133-nationalcampaigns/national_strategy/strategy_cyprus.doc).

³⁴ National Strategy on intercultural Education, Official English Version (available online: <http://www.interculturaldialogue2008.eu>).

discovery of cultural otherness. Without teasing out first student's understanding of race and by re-inscribing discriminatory racism with the glorification of the other's cultural difference, elementary schools have come to frame migrant students as representatives of national cultures.

In contrast to elementary schools, secondary schools had not embrace multiculturalism in such a celebratory manner. In the case of secondary education, increasing the enrolment of migrant students in Greek Cypriot public schools rather than promoting intercultural interaction became the guiding aim of immigrant student integration policy. During the period of 2003-2004, 1.866 non Cypriot students were enrolled in Gymnasiums and Lyceums. By 2006, this number increased to 2.052 students. Interestingly, these enrolment figures are also cited as "indicators" of social inclusion for the years 2003.2004, and 2006 correspondingly (Social Inclusion Report, 2006, p.87). To the extent enrolment of migrant students in secondary education and not quality of intercultural interaction is framed as the indicator of social inclusion, mainstreaming migrant students has become the primary goal of multicultural education at the secondary level. In addition to this, the subject oriented approach and the fragmentation of the teaching time into slots of time devoted to different subject matters with different instructors do not allow opportunities for thematizing and adding-on supplements of "epochal" themes, such as intercultural education. The marginalization of immigrant students has become normalized through the educational apparatus of "auditors" ("akroatés"): newcomer immigrant students are placed as auditors at a grade level maximum a year lower than their age level and were granted an one year gratis (i.e., exemption from exams and evaluation) to learn, through immersion in a native language communicative environment, the language of instruction.³⁵

Conclusions

This policy analysis review has described the development of migration policy in Cyprus, analyzed the reasons gender becomes overshadowed in state and other statistics and sidestepped by policy itself, and traced some shifts, discontinuities and contradiction in the official migration discourse. One of the problems we had to reckon with was the presentation and analysis of migration movements in northern Cyprus since this area is not "under the effective control of the Republic of Cyprus" and thus migration in this area is exempted from official migration discourse and statistics. We have tried to show that migration discourse implicates the performativity of state sovereignty as well as the Republic's politics of non-recognition of TRNC (an illegal state). We have also suggested that Cyprus's EU accession marked the enactment of significant gender equality and non-discrimination legal development, but at the same time marked the shift from an economic discourse on migration to the securitization of migration. After Cyprus EU accession, the new migrants (i.e., others than Greek Pontians) were to be re-invented as "Third Country Nationals", a classification which erases their internal diversity as well as cultural links or historical relations to Cyprus (e.g., Indian and Sri-Lankan migrants were also colonial subjects of the British Empire; Lebanese and Syrians had historically very close links to Cyprus within the 'global' economic and cultural space of "the Levant" and the British Empire). What matters in this

³⁵ The policy of mainstreaming "different students" as "auditors" in the comprehensive classroom was originally developed as an accommodating measure for "special education students".

new classification (Nationals, EU Nationals and Third Country Nationals) is not who these migrants are, but their legal status as short-term and low-skill workers in the unified economic and security space of EU. What this review suggests is that female migrant workers are the most precarious groups of migrants and they experience intersecting forms of exclusion (i.e., sexism and racialization). The absence of gender mainstreaming in social inclusion policy as well as the absence of migration/ethnicity mainstreaming in gender equality policy reinforce the invisibility of the particular forms of social exclusion and racism experience by migrant women.

In the case of Cyprus, NGOs have only recently started to emerge as policy actors and shapers of public opinion. Their contribution has been particularly crucial in tracing feminized terrains of migrant employment exempted from equality and human rights policy. What is missing, however, even in NGO reports is an analysis of gender and ethnicity as dynamic fields of social interaction and cultural renegotiation rather than a gender or race sensitive approach to specific groups of migrants. Furthermore, the emphasis of NGOs and social activists groups on forms of gender exclusion and racialization experienced by migrants, underlined by the intention to render visible the exclusions and violence experienced by migrants in general and migrant women in particular, entails the risk of further objectifying these migrants and framing the position of migrants as, immanently, a position of "victimization". This also implicates the risk of conflating intercultural contact with processes of racialization and cultural misrecognition. This risk is further reinforced by the absence of organized groups of migrants as well as the absence of research on subaltern resistance and multiple subject positionalities which enable the development of alternative kinds of agency.

These absences in research and NGO interventions underline the significance of this project's emphasis on intercultural transformation. In designing the research methodology and framing the fields of action for the thematic areas, we need to focus on terrains and experiences which help us understand how gender and cultural identity are renegotiated in intercultural settings. In order to do that, we need to focus on arenas and settings rather than on groups of migrants, on processes of interactive renegotiation of gender and ethnicity rather than on discriminatory structures and institutions, on lived experiences rather than on identity. Such an approach would also help us avoid the risk of eroticising otherness or conflating intercultural transactions with the burden of identity.

With particular reference to the thematic area of intercultural education, this policy review suggests that measures for multicultural education have been used to ontologize "culture" and "cultural difference", to separate multiculturalism from issues of global justice, and to delineate it within the exceptional space of schools as "intercultural education". This observation presents us with the challenge of deconstructing the reified understandings and uses of intercultural education as a socio-pedagogical 'pharmacy' and an algorithmic mode of action for promoting social integration. A focus on the intercultural interactions that take place in schools would help us identify both normalized forms of racial/gender violence and forms of cultural interaction that promote the agency of students, migrants and non-migrants, as subjects of cultural mediation, translation and hybridization.

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Annex: Tables and Figures

Table 1 Migration Flows to and from Cyprus, 1981-2005 (Demographic Statistics 2005 Report)

Χρόνος Year	Μετανάστες προς την Κύπρο ⁽¹⁾ Long term Immigrants ⁽¹⁾			Μετανάστες από την Κύπρο ⁽²⁾ Emigrants ⁽²⁾	Καθαρή Μετανάστευση ⁽³⁾ Net Migration ⁽³⁾	Μετανάστες μικρής διάρκειας ⁽¹⁾ Short term Immigrants ⁽¹⁾		
	Σύνολο Total	Άντρες Males	Γυναίκες Females			Σύνολο Total	Άντρες Males	Γυναίκες Females
1981	246	129	117	...	196
1982	390	181	209	...	-31
1983	597	297	300	79	518
1984	251	117	134	96	155
1985	329	168	161	91	238
1986	354	176	178	179	175	9.195	6.516	2.679
1987	454	232	222	182	272	9.457	7.867	1.590
1988	383	187	196	126	257	10.156	8.373	1.783
1989	4.526	16.556	12.007	4.549
1990	8.707	20.673	13.825	6.848
1991	10.559
1992	9.999
1993	8.000
1994	7.000
1995	6.000
1996	5.300
1997	4.800
1998	8.801*	4.255	4.491	...	4.200	21.206*	9.360	11.577
1999	8.524*	3.978	4.482	...	4.200	15.812*	7.138	8.538
2000	12.764	6.298	6.466	...	3.960	22.187	10.543	11.644
2001	17.485	9.563	7.922	...	4.650	8.641	3.435	5.206
2002	14.370	6.682	7.688	7.485	6.885	8.364	3.319	5.045
2003	16.779	8.815	7.964	4.437	12.342	10.353	4.761	5.592
2004	22.003	10.502	11.501	6.279	15.724	17.791	9.721	8.070
2005	24.419	10.604	13.815	10.003	14.416	19.243	9.156	10.087

Table 2 Net Migration 1961-2003, selection from Table 16, Vital Statistics and Indicators, 1961-2003 (Source: Demographic Report 2003)

Χρόνος Year	Καθαρή μετανάστευση Net migration	
	Αριθμός Number (000's)	Ποσοστό Rate
1961
1965	-2,8	-4,8
1970	-0,9	-1,4
1975	-27,6	-44,6
1980	0,2	0,4
1981	-0,5	-0,8
1982	-0,6	-0,9
1983	0,1	0,1
1984	-0,2	-0,3
1985	0,2	0,3
1986	-1,4	-2,1
1987	-1,6	-2,4
1988	-2,1	-3,2
1989	1,8	2,6
1990	5,3	7,7
1991	6,4	9,2
1992	6,8	9,6
1993	5,7	7,9
1994	4,8	6,5
1995	4,4	5,9
1996	3,3	4,4
1997	3,2	4,3
1998	3,8	4,9
1999	3,5	4,5
2000	3,3	4,2
2001	4,0	5,1
2002	6,4	8,0
2003	12,3	15,3

Table 3 Immigration by Main Country of Citizenship, 2003 (Source: Commission 2003 Migration Report on Cyprus)

	2003
Total Immigration	16,779
Nationals	1,994
Non-Nationals	14,785
<i>of which</i>	
EU Nationals (EU 15)	7,884
Nationals of 10 EU Accession States	390
Non-EU 25 Nationals	6,511
<i>Most Important Non-EU 25 Nationals:</i>	
Russian Federation	1,594
Sri Lanka	654
Philippines	504
Bulgaria	444
Syrian Arab Republic	356
China	348
India	327
Ukraine	279
Romania	246
South Africa	210
Other Non-EU 25 Nationals	1,549

Source: GéDAP/Eurostat 2006

Table 4 Largest Immigrant flows from Eastern European and Asian Countries by country of citizenship and sex, 2005 (data from Demographic Report 2005)

Country	Total	Men	Women
Sri Lanka	1278	96	1182
Russia	1257	355	902
Philippines	981	17	901
Romania	614	246	368
Bulgaria	436	128	308
Ukraine	412	66	346
China	361	161	200
Moldavia	211	8	203

Table 5 Emigrants by citizenship and sex (Source: Demographic Report 2005)

Χρόνος Year	Σύνολο - Total			Κυπριακή - Cypriots			ΕΕ (24) - EU (24)			Εκτός ΕΕ - Non EU		
	Σύνολο	Άντρες	Γυναίκες	Σύνολο	Άντρες	Γυναίκες	Σύνολο	Άντρες	Γυναίκες	Σύνολο	Άντρες	Γυναίκες
	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females
2002	7.485	3.608	3.877	1.641	1.288	353	1.607	1.000	607	4.237	1.320	2.917
2003	4.437	1.592	2.845	619	325	294	863	361	502	2.955	906	2.049
2004	6.279	1.984	4.295	629	431	198	718	378	340	4.932	1.175	3.757
2005	10.003	3.357	6.646	316	148	168	1.542	698	844	8.145	2.511	5.634

Table 6 (as cited by the Ministry) "Work permits" issued in the years 2000-2005 (Source: Turkish Cypriot daily "HALKIN SESİ", 30/12/05)

Year	Total	First issue	Renewal
2000	6113	4661	1502
2001	5311	3942	1837
2002	5828	3521	2307
2003	6948	4124	2374
2004	12429	9656	2773
2005	42779	36200	6579

Table 7 Population, increase (natural, net migration, total), percentage of foreigners, density (at the end of the year) in the part controlled by the Turkish Cypriot Administration (Source: Cuco Report 1992)

Year	Population in thousands	Rate of natural increase (% pop.)	Net migration (% pop.)	Rate of increase/decrease (% pop.)	Percentage of foreigners	Density persons
1974	115,6					
1975	126,9	1,30	+ 8,36	9,66	0,16	37,8
1976	130,1	1,20	+ 1,31	2,51		38,8
1977	145,0	1,02	+ 10,40	11,42		43,2
1978	146,7	1,04	+ 0,16	1,20		43,7
1979	148,5	1,10	+ 0,10	1,20		44,3
1980	149,6	1,00	- 0,25	0,75		44,6
1981	151,2	1,01	+ 0,07	1,08		45,1
1982	153,2	1,20	+ 0,12	1,32		45,7
1983	155,5	1,15	+ 0,34	1,49		46,4
1984	158,0	1,12	+ 0,46	1,58		47,1
1985	160,3	1,15	+ 0,30	1,45	0,60	47,8
1986	162,7	1,10	+ 0,39	1,49		48,5
1987	165,0	1,25	+ 0,20	1,45		49,2
1988	167,3	1,22	+ 0,10	1,32		49,9
1989	169,3	1,11	+ 0,08	1,19		50,5
1990	171,5	1,25	+ 0,04	1,29		51,1

Growth rate of the population for the period 1974-90: 48,35%

Table 8 (cited from Basim and Jenkins, 2006)

Estimation of Migrants Working in North Cyprus		
Types of Migrants	Inflows	Total and Informal
1. Inflow-Outflow Differences ^a		49,846
2. Foreign Students in Universities ^b	15,472	
From Turkey.....		13,595
From 3 rd countries.....		1,877
3. Migrants with Work Permits ^c	8,406	
Long-Term (yearly).....		5,906
Seasonal (Citrus and Plantation).....		2,500
4. Economically Inactive Migrants ^d	5,193	
5. Informal (Illegal) Working Migrants ^e		20,775

Sources: a. Immigration Office Report (2002)
b. SPO (2002)
c. Employment Office Report (2001)
d. Employment Office Report (2002) and authors' estimation
e. Row 5=Row 1- Row 2- Row 3-Row 4

Table 9 (cited from Basim and Jenkins, 2006)

Distribution of Informal Employment by Sectors	
Sectors	% of Informal Employment
1 Agriculture.....	3.5
2 Industry.....	15.7
3 Construction.....	43.5
4 Trade, Hotels, Restaurant.....	30.6
5 Transportation.....	2.8
6 Financial Institutions.....	0.8
7 Business and Personal Services.....	3.1
8 Total	100

Source: Employment office, North Cyprus (2002)

Table 10 Work Permits issued for migrant workers in northern Cyprus
(Source: Mehmet 2007)

Work Permit Applications by Year (1999–2005)			
Year	Total	New	Extension
1999	5,828	4,156	1,672
2000	6,113	4,611	1,502
2001	5,311	3,924	1,387
2002	5,828	3,521	2,307
2003	6,498	4,124	2,374
2004	12,429	9,656	2,773
2005	46,010	38,464	7,546

Table 11 Gender disaggregated data on Turkish Migrant workers in northern Cyprus
(Source: Mehmet 2006)

DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF TURKISH GUEST-WORKERS by GENDER				
Türk Misafir işçilerin cinsiyete göre olan statistiki açılımı				
1. Average age / Ortalama yaş: Women/Kadın 29 yrs (min 17-max 49) Men/Erkek 30 yrs (min 17- max 52)				
2. Marital status/Medeni Hal: Women/Kadın – Men/Erkek 45.5% married/Evli				
3. Came to NC, KK gelmiş				
	Women/Kadın	Men/Erkek		
With their families/aileleri ile	30.2%	16.3%		
By themselves/tek başlarına	63.5%	82.4%		
With friends/arkadaşlar	6.3%	1.3%		
4. Highest level of education/Eğitim Düzeyi:				
	Elementary ilkokul	junior school ortaokul	Secondary Lise	Universite Üniversite
Women Kadın	42.9%	15.9%	25.4%	15.9%
Men Erkek	60.8 %	13.5%	20%	5.3%
5. Unskilled/Vasıfsız:				
	Women /Kadın	55.6%		
	Men/Erkek	55.5%		
6. Majority from; Çoğunluk				
	Women/Kadın	Aegean/Ege	35%	
	Men /Erkek	South East Anatolia/ Güney Doğu Anadolu	42%	
7. How long do they plan to stay in NC:Ne kadar süre KK'da kalmayı planlıyorlar				
		Men/Erkek	Women/Kadın	
Do not plan to turn back Geri dönmeyi planlamıyor		51.4%	52.4%	
Depends on available opportunities Çıkacak olan fırsatlara bağlı		38.8%	33.3%	

Table 12 Turkish Cypriots employed in the RoC controlled areas
(Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance, Statistics Office)

Number of Turkish Cypriots engaged in employment in the government controlled area and contributed to the Social Insurance Fund by economic activity and district of employment for April 2008

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY	DISTRICT					TOTAL
	NICOSIA	LIMASSOL	LARNACA	PAPHOS	FAMAGUSTA	
1. AGRICULTURE/LIVESTOCK/HUNTING/FORESTRY	11	1	1	-	-	13
2. FISHING	-	-	-	-	-	-
3. MINING/QUARRYING	7	-	5	2	-	14
4. MANUFACTURING	165	9	54	1	52	281
5. WATER SUPPLY/ ELECTRICITY/GAS	-	-	-	-	-	-
6. CONSTRUCTION	739	47	511	24	398	1,719
7. WHOLE,RETAIL TRADE	145	7	27	2	14	195
8. HOTELS/RESTAURANTS	20	3	9	1	32	65
9. TRANSPORT/COMMUNICATION/STORAGE	15	2	13	1	2	33
10. INSURANCE/FINANCIAL SERVICES	13	2	-	-	-	15
11. TRADE SERVICES	98	84	7	1	4	194
12. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	61	-	-	-	-	61
13. EDUCATION	11	-	-	-	-	11
14. HEALTH & SOCIAL ACTIVITIES	5	-	-	-	1	6
15. OTHER SERVICES	20	1	4	3	3	31
16. PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS	1	1	-	-	-	2
17. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATIONS	23	-	-	-	-	23
18. SOVEREIGN BASES AREA (EPISKOPE, DHEKELIA)	-	135	-	-	-	135
TOTAL	1,334	292	631	35	506	2,798

Table 13 Numbers of migrants by citizenship and gender, for the period 2001-2005. (Source: Demographic Report 2005)

Χρόνος Year	Σύνολο - Total			Κυπριακή - Cypriots			ΕΕ (24) - EU (24)			Εκτός ΕΕ - Non EU		
	Σύνολο	Άντρες	Γυναίκες	Σύνολο	Άντρες	Γυναίκες	Σύνολο	Άντρες	Γυναίκες	Σύνολο	Άντρες	Γυναίκες
	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females
2001	17.485	9.563	7.922	3.619	2.344	1.275	7.307	4.225	3.082	6.559	2.994	3.565
2002	14.370	6.682	7.688	2.154	1.229	925	7.793	3.638	4.155	4.423	1.815	2.608
2003	16.779	8.815	7.964	1.994	1.198	796	8.274	4.405	3.869	6.511	3.212	3.299
2004	22.003	10.502	11.501	1.760	897	863	13.022	7.087	5.935	7.221	2.518	4.703
2005	24.419	10.604	13.815	2.540	1.346	1.194	14.234	6.985	7.249	7.645	2.273	5.372

Table 14 Numbers of migrants by citizenship and gender, for the period 2001-2005. (Source: Demographic Report 2005)

Μήνας	2001			2002			2003			2004			2005			Month
	Σύνολο	Άντρες	Γυναίκες	Σύνολο	Άντρες	Γυναίκες	Σύνολο	Άντρες	Γυναίκες	Σύνολο	Άντρες	Γυναίκες	Σύνολο	Άντρες	Γυναίκες	
	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	
Σύνολο	8.641	3.435	5.206	8.364	3.319	5.045	10.353	4.761	5.592	17.791	9.721	8.070	19.243	9.156	10.087	Total
Ιανουάριος	356	94	262	581	213	368	402	245	157	1.660	1.128	532	1.230	660	570	January
Φεβρουάριος	659	187	472	365	118	247	333	133	200	1.021	519	502	1.330	631	699	February
Μάρτιος	1.604	487	1.117	1.054	295	759	595	207	388	1.471	920	551	2.319	1.211	1.108	March
Ιανουάριο- Μάρτιο	2.619	768	1.851	2.000	626	1.374	1.330	585	745	4.152	2.567	1.585	4.879	2.502	2.377	January- March
Απρίλιος	1.360	562	798	1.497	456	1.041	736	293	443	2.636	1.449	1.187	3.114	1.363	1.751	April
Μάϊος	1.152	406	746	1.433	607	826	896	441	455	2.869	1.224	1.645	2.502	1.127	1.375	May
Ιούνιος	1.073	470	603	965	381	584	1.528	463	1.065	1.965	822	1.143	2.430	881	1.549	June
Απρίλιο- Ιούνιο	3.585	1.438	2.147	3.895	1.444	2.451	3.160	1.197	1.963	7.470	3.495	3.975	8.046	3.371	4.675	April- June
Ιούλιος	507	222	285	651	341	310	1.118	355	763	1.117	620	497	1.348	616	732	July
Αύγουστος	373	158	215	400	263	137	1.044	539	505	1.098	705	393	1.151	630	521	August
Σεπτέμβριος	438	321	117	415	294	121	1.263	645	618	1.201	650	551	1.370	677	693	September
Ιούλιο- Σεπτέμβριο	1.318	701	617	1.466	898	568	3.425	1.539	1.886	3.416	1.975	1.441	3.869	1.923	1.946	July- September
Οκτώβριος	319	223	96	395	130	265	489	140	349	899	516	383	1.214	774	440	October
Νοέμβριος	524	153	371	223	34	189	833	498	335	1.051	669	382	638	325	313	November
Δεκέμβριος	276	152	124	385	187	198	1.116	802	314	803	499	304	597	261	336	December
Οκτ.- Δεκέμβριο	1.119	528	591	1.003	351	652	2.438	1.440	998	2.753	1.684	1.069	2.449	1.360	1.089	Oct.- December

Table 15 EU National Employees by sector of employment
(Source: Social Insurance Service, Statistics Office)

Table showing the number of E.U. citizens employed in Cyprus by Country and economic activity during January 2008

	Austria	Belgium	Bulgaria*	France	Germany	Denmark	Switzerland	Greece	Estonia	United Kingdom	Ireland	Spain	Iceland	Italy	The Netherlands	Latvia	Lithuania	Luxembourg	Malta	Norway	Hungary	Poland	Portugal	Romania*	Slovakia	Slovenia	Sweden	Czech Republic	Finland	C.N.S**	Total	
AGRICULTURE / LIVESTOCK / HUNTING / FORESTRY	0	0	203	1	0	0	0	17	0	18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	185	8	0	1	0	0	133	580	
FISHING	0	0	2	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	4	0	0	0	1	0	4	18	
MINING / QUARRYING	0	0	9	0	1	0	0	18	0	6	2	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	5	0	7	1	0	0	0	0	3	54	
MANUFACTURING	5	2	789	9	21	1	0	894	8	207	5	8	0	6	3	15	18	0	1	3	14	375	0	1255	152	5	1	19	8	648	4448	
WATER SUPPLY/ ELECTRICITY / GAS	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	11	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	22	
CONSTRUCTION	2	8	861	58	22	0	1	1860	4	853	7	1	1	4	8	44	38	0	0	3	24	912	1	1945	265	3	3	28	1	910	7881	
WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE	12	8	882	31	48	9	7	1430	9	545	10	7	0	10	23	67	48	1	0	5	23	360	5	978	114	3	23	18	10	873	5553	
HOTELS	14	8	332	13	101	2	4	999	7	234	4	1	0	8	12	32	20	0	2	1	80	393	3	323	239	7	11	31	12	138	3039	
RESTAURANTS	8	2	614	8	23	4	2	696	15	325	10	4	0	6	18	44	45	0	1	1	48	346	0	738	328	1	7	78	3	723	4088	
TRANSPORT / COMMUNICATION / STORAGE	24	11	114	20	129	8	4	265	8	300	11	0	0	8	21	22	3	0	2	1	179	101	1	128	42	8	12	18	8	102	1538	
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION	2	2	9	10	6	0	0	125	1	116	3	0	0	3	2	12	8	0	0	1	4	11	1	11	19	0	14	2	3	40	405	
OTHER TRADE SERVICES	15	9	188	58	72	7	4	549	11	1145	23	14	2	25	37	40	118	3	8	7	27	500	7	492	51	8	41	21	18	485	3981	
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	1	1	5	4	6	0	0	1069	0	32	0	5	0	3	1	2	2	0	0	0	1	8	2	1	3	0	3	0	0	91	1240	
EDUCATION	2	1	21	34	27	3	0	179	0	294	5	8	0	8	4	1	1	0	0	2	5	9	2	20	0	0	8	2	2	84	718	
HEALTH & SOCIAL WORK	1	1	68	5	22	0	1	216	3	91	2	1	0	2	8	2	3	0	0	1	8	15	1	39	18	2	4	8	5	68	589	
OTHER COMMUNITY, SOCIAL ACTIVITIES	1	5	128	28	24	8	0	308	2	415	3	1	0	14	12	13	10	1	0	0	33	57	25	140	28	10	5	11	4	202	1488	
PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS	0	0	68	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	24	1	1	0	0	0	127	230	
EXTRA-TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATIONS	4	0	0	12	1	1	0	5	0	11	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	48	
NOT STATED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	89	54	4278	292	501	41	23	8644	66	4595	85	49	3	93	146	296	309	5	14	25	455	3117	50	6286	1266	46	133	231	70	4636	35898	

Table 16 Third Country National Employees by sector of employment
(Source: Social Insurance Service, Statistics Office)

TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER OF ALIENS¹ EMPLOYED IN CYPRUS BY ECONOMIC ACTIVITY DURING 2008

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY	January 2008	April 2008	July 2008	October 2008	MEAN NUMBER ³	PERCENTAGE
1. AGRICULTURE/LIVESTOCK/HUNTING/FORESTRY	3,605				3,605	6.78%
2. FISHING	56				56	0.11%
3. MINING/QUARRYING	51				51	0.10%
4. MANUFACTURING	3,716				3,716	6.99%
5. WATER SUPPLY/ ELECTRICITY/GAS	22				22	0.04%
6. CONSTRUCTION	4,982				4,982	9.37%
7. WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE	6,294				6,294	11.84%
8. HOTELS	1,668				1,668	3.14%
9. RESTAURANTS ²	5,181				5,181	9.74%
10. TRANSPORT/COMMUNICATION/STORAGE	885				885	1.66%
11. FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION	514				514	0.97%
12. OTHER TRADE SERVICES	2,749				2,749	5.17%
13. PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION	1,106				1,106	2.08%
14. EDUCATION	604				604	1.14%
15. HEALTH & SOCIAL WORK	1,042				1,042	1.96%
16. OTHER COMMUNITY, SOCIAL ACTIVITIES	1,535				1,535	2.89%
17. PRIVATE HOUSEHOLDS	18,404				18,404	34.61%
18. EXTRA-TERRITORIAL ORGANIZATIONS	74				74	0.14%
19. NON STATED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY	684				684	1.29%
TOTAL	53,172	-	-	-	53,172	100.00%

¹ In the above number aliens that live permanently in Cyprus may be included.

³ Persons who had more than one employment were considered more than once in the total of 53.172 employees and consequently the actual number of employees is **51.778**.

